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Paternalism Versus Pugnacity: The Right
to Counsel in Japan and the United States
DAVID A. SUEss*

INTRODUCTION

Anthropologist Clifford Geertz posits a truism that for "a state to do more than
administer privilege and defend itself against its own population, its acts must
seem continuous with the selves of those whose state it pretends it is, its
citizens-to be, in some stepped-up, amplified sense, their acts."' Professor
Geertz's observation serves as a reminder to all who study law, or any institution
in society, that institutions and rules in society must reflect the values and beliefs
of citizens within that society if they are to maintain continued support and
validity.
The United States and Japan have developed, and operate, their institutions,
organizations, and laws against a backdrop of extremely different historical,
social, political, and economic forces. With this understanding in mind, there is
no reason to expect both countries 2 to view their citizens in the same manner or
accord them similar rights. That being said, through one shared historical
experience, World War II, both countries do measure their laws and legal
systems against substantially similar constitutions. The different forces, however,
lead to very different interpretations of similar textual provisions. This Note
focuses on the right to assistance of counsel in the United States and Japan.
Given the ideological and philosophical underpinnings to such a right, this Note
examines the role and meaning of the right to counsel and what the timing and
quality of that right teaches us about each system.
Part I of this Note summarizes the right-to-counsel doctrine in U.S. criminal
procedure jurisprudence, mapping out the historical progression of the right, its
Fifth and Sixth Amendment foundations, the stated and implicit reasons which
support the right, and the contours of the right in practice. In a similar vein, Part
II summarizes the right-to-counsel doctrine in Japan; specifically, the point at
which the right to counsel attaches and the comparatively stringent limits placed
on that right. Part III examines the reasons the right to counsel in the United
States and Japan differs so much and discusses the broader objectives of each
system and the respective roles the right to counsel plays in each. Finally, Part

* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Indiana University-Bloomington; B.A., 1991, The University
of Chicago. I would like to thank Professor Joseph L. Hoffmann for his advice, and Shannon
Clark for her editorial support, throughout the writing of this Note.
I. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 317 (1973) (emphasis in
original). Although this statement has been quoted in discussions of Japan's non-litigious ethos
and "consensual myth," J. Mark Ramseyer, The Cost of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust
Enforcement andInstitutionalBarriersto Litigation in Japan,94 YALE L.J. 604, 641 (1985),
the statement holds true with equal force in the criminal law context of both the United States
and Japan.
2. The author uses terms like "society" and "country" as an amalgam which represents
broad majorities of people who support the laws and institutions of governance.

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:291

IV concludes with a discussion of lessons each country might learn, with respect
to both general objectives and specific processes, by analyzing the other's
approach.
This Note does not suggest that the U.S. system should be more like Japan's
or that Japan's system should be more like the one in the United States. Through
comparison, however, each system can better evaluate the underlying goals of
their own criminal process. Beyond the obvious goal of reducing crime, what
other goals does criminal process serve? This discussion proceeds along an
analytical framework which examines whether criminal process-and
specifically, the right to counsel-vindicates substantive criminal law goals and
performs a legitimation function by helping resolve state-citizen disputes in a
manner that commands the community's respect. The right-to-counsel analysis
highlights the debate within each system about the proper role of suspects' and
defendants' rights and whether those rights serve the interests of those
individuals and society.
I.

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THE UNITED STATES

In order to grasp the significance of the right to counsel in our system of
criminal justice, one must first understand the contours of that right, both past
and present. As an initial matter, the right to counsel in the American criminal
process is grounded on both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.3 As those Amendments protect different interests, the context,
timing, and activation of the right to counsel differs depending on which
Amendment is implicated. The following discussion examines, first, the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel, predicated on Mirandav. Arizona4 and its progeny,
followed by an examination of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel based on
Massiah v. United States5 and its progeny.
A. The FifthAmendment Right to Counsel
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that "[n]o person ...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."6 In
1966, the Supreme Court held in Miranda that the constitutional guarantee
against self-incrimination required limits on police custodial interrogations to
prevent coercion by physical force or more subtle psychological means! To
ensure that police observed these limits, the Court established a bright-line rule,
noting that "after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way, ' the police must apprise him of his
rights:

3. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI.
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. Miranda,384 U.S. at 447-48.
8. Id. at 444.
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Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If
however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no
questioning .... The mere fact that he may have answered some questions
or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right
to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an
attorney ....
9
Although the right of the accused to the presence of an attorney appears nowhere
in the text of the Fifth Amendment, the Court has determined that this right
implicitly stems from the right against self-incrimination.
As the Miranda Court explained, the process of custodial interrogation
contains inherent pressures that work to compel an accused to speak when he
would rather remain silent. This premise led the Court to hold that "[i]n order to
combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege
against self-incrimination,"" certain procedural safeguards were necessary,
including informing the accused that he has the right to have counsel present
during custodial interrogation. 2 After the authorities read the warnings, and the
suspect indicates that he wishes to have counsel present, the police must cease
all interrogation unless the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
waives the right to counsel. 3
As with any ground-breaking decision that purportedly creates a bright-line
rule, subsequent clarification of Miranda became necessary. For example, the
Court in Rhode Island v. Innis4 defined interrogation as questioning that is direct
or that is "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect."' 5 Such a definition does not comport with the images of bare-fisted
interrogation or psychological trickery designed to overbear the will of a
suspect-which some of the language in Mirandabrought to mind. Nonetheless,
this definition reflects a concern for surreptitious or covert interrogation likely
to cause a suspect to incriminate himself.
Another point of clarification revolved around the issue of waiver; specifically,
at which point police may continue questioning a suspect after he has invoked his
Fifth Amendment right to counsel pursuant to Miranda.The Court resolved this

9. Id. at 444-45.
10. David E. Sipprell, CriminalLaw-theRight to Counsel-Davisv. U.S., 114 S. Ct. 2350,
73 N.C. L. Rnv. 2013, 2013 (1995).
11. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
12. Id. at 469.
13. Idat 474-75. Furthermore, once a suspect invokes his right to counsel under the Fifth
Amendment, "a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to
retained or appointed counsel." Id, at 475 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n. 14
(1964)).
14. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
15. Id. at 301.
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issue in Edwards v. Arizona.16 In this case, police arrested Edwards for robbery,
burglary, and first-degree murder."7 Police read Edwards his Miranda rights and
submitted him to questioning. He later requested to speak with an attorney, at
which point police ceased questioning and took him to jail. The next morning,
two different detectives came to the jail, reread him his Miranda rights, and
questioned him without counsel present.' 8 During the questioning, Edwards
implicated himself; his admissions were subsequently used against him on the
basis that his statements were considered voluntary, and he was found guilty of
the crimes charged. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision,
holding:
[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during
custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by
showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial
interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights . . . . [H]aving
expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, [he] is not
subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,
exchanges, or conversations with the police.' 9
Such an approach, the Court felt, added further protection from coercion, yet
still allowed an accused to speak with the police without counsel present, so long
as the police did not initiate the conversation. While this standard still poses
definitional problems concerning "suspect-initiated" conversation, the Court
noted that to constitute valid waiver of one's Mirandarights, it is "necessary...
that the accused, not the police, reopen[] the dialogue with the authorities."20
Since "waivers of counsel . . . constitute a knowing and intelligent
J
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege[,]"
' the Court's
holding suggests that merely speaking with police does not constitute such a
waiver.
In the 1988 case of Arizona v. Roberson,' the Court made another far-reaching
decision implementing the Miranda-Edwardsrule. In Roberson, the Court
considered the issue of whether police may interrogate an accused about a
different crime than the one for which he has invoked his right to counsel. The
state argued that Edwards should only preclude further questioning about the
offense for which the suspect invoked the Miranda right to counsel. The
Supreme Court held, however, that the Miranda-Edwardsrule requires police to
stop all interrogations regarding any offense once the suspect invokes his
Miranda right to counsel.23 The Court solidified this position in McNeil v.

16. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
17.Id. at 478.
18. Id. at 479.
19. Id at 484-85. This holding has had significance beyond the Fifth Amendment custodial
interrogation context, as discussed infra at text accompanying note 51.
20. Id. at 486 n.9.
21. Id. at 483; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
22. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
23. Id. at 687-88.
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Wisconsin,24 when it stated that "[t]he Edwards rule ... is not offense specific:
Once a suspect invokes the Mirandaright to counsel for interrogation regarding
one offense, he may not be reapproached regarding any offense unless counsel
is present."25
Thus, a suspect may invoke26 this Fifth Amendment right to counsel at the
point of custodial interrogation, after which the police may not initiate further
interrogation-communication likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect-regarding any offense. Although the Court allows use of statements
elicited from suspects in violation of Miranda for impeachment and other
purposes,27 the Court has consistently prevented use of such statements in the
prosecution's case-in-chief.2 Without getting bogged down in the debate over
the practical significance of allowing any versus no use of the fruits of Miranda
violations, these decisions suggest a great deal about the purposes of the rule.
Throughout the foregoing cases, the Court notes its concern with the
"'inherently compelling pressures' of custodial interrogation"'29 and notes that the
rules are "designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving
his [right to counsel]." 3 Prior to Miranda, the Court assessed suspect
confessions for their voluntariness, invalidating them only upon a showing that,
in the totality of the circumstances, the defendant involuntarily made the
statement in question. 3' Such an approach was inherently case-by-case and did
not give police clear guidelines regarding conduct which was or was not
constitutional. Thus, the Court instituted Miranda'sprophylactic bright-line rule
to which the police must adhere in order to avoid a presumption that police
obtained the confession unconstitutionally. The perceived need for such brightline rules to protect the rights of the accused denotes one great point of departure
between Japan and the United States: in Japan, the police enjoy tremendous
public support and are highly trusted; whereas in the United States, certain

24. 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
25. Id at 177 (emphasis in original) (citing Roberson, 486 U.S. at 678).
26. "[The suspect must unambiguously request counsel" in order to invoke his Miranda
right to counsel. The suspect must articulate the request clearly enough that "a reasonable
officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney."
Davis v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355 (1994). It is important to note that once police
read a suspect his Mirandarights, they may approach the suspect only once to seek a waiver
of that right; courts carefully analyze circumstances surrounding waiver to ensure that it was
knowingly and intelligently given. This requirement affords suspects the opportunity to speak
directly with police at the outset while still allowing suspects the freedom from potential
coercion by invoking those rights.
27. Sipprell, supranote 10, at 2016 n.39 (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)).
28. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177.
29. Id. at 176; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
30. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990).
31. Courts still assess confessions for their voluntariness. Thus, if a defendant can show that
his confession was involuntarily elicited (as, for example, through physical beating), the
prosecution may not use the confession either in the case-in-chief or for impeachment purposes.
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groups, especially minority communities, view the police with suspicion and
widespread distrust.32
B. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Although concerns with coercion play a subtextual role, the Sixth Amendment
right-to-counsel jurisprudence depends more on "fair process" and "dignitary
norms" within the adversary system.33 This section first explains the contours of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and highlights the right for the accused
to be free from surreptitious and overt interrogation after the state has initiated
adversarial proceedings against him.
The Sixth Amendment reads: "[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." 34 The
decisions which apply this constitutional principle involve police use of codefendants, or jail-cell informants, to obtain confessions and other damaging
statements from the accused after he or she has been indicted. In the case of
Massiahv. United States,35 which first defined present Sixth Amendment rightto-counsel doctrine, the petitioner retained a lawyer and pled not guilty after the
government indicted him for violating federal narcotics laws. While he was free
on bail, the petitioner made some incriminating statements which a federal agent
overheard by surreptitious means. Over petitioner's objection, the state
introduced evidence of these statements against him at trial, and he was
convicted.36 Noting that an interrogation by police in extra-judicial settings
without counsel present "den[ies] a defendant 'effective representation by
counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him[,]"' 37 the
Court recognized that the same denial of representation occurs regardless of
whether the interrogation is direct, or indirect and surreptitious.38
The Court held, therefore, that the state had deprived petitioner of his right to
counsel "when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own
incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him
after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel." 39 Emphasizing its
concern over the fairness of extra-judicial proceedings, the Court asserted that:
[T]he most critical period of the proceedings.... that is to say, from the time
of the arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation,
thorough-going investigation and preparation [are] vitally important, the

32. For example, the widely publicized police beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles in
1991, and public reaction to L.A. Police Detective Mark Furhman's racist statements about
planting evidence to frame African-Americans during the infamous murder trial of O.J.
Simpson in 1995 highlighted the apparent trust gap between law enforcement and minority
communities.
33. Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel UnderSiege: Requiem for an EndangeredRight,
29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 59 (1991).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

35. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
36. Id. at 203.
37. Id.at 204 (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959)).
38. Id. at 206.
39. 1d.
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defendants... [are] as much entitled to such aid [of counsel] during that
period as at trial itself.4"
Thus, rather than protecting the accused from police coercion, the Court's
holding and dicta evidence a concern that surreptitious interrogation of
defendants would compromise the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.
The Massiah doctrine lay dormant for thirteen years, primarily because
Mirandahad eclipsed it, until the Court decided Brewer v. Williams.4 In Brewer,
Williams, the defendant, turned himself in to the police and was arraigned on an
arrest warrant in Davenport, Iowa. Detectives who had been investigating the
murder of a ten-year-old girl (whose body had not yet been found) transported
Williams to Des Moines for trial. During his transportation, one of the detectives
appealed to Williams's "religious sensibilities" by giving a speech about the need
for a proper Christian burial for the little girl. The defendant responded to the
speech by directing the detectives to the site of the body.42 All of these events
occurred despite defense counsel's request that police not question Williams
until he arrived in Des Moines and consulted with counsel.
Because adversarial proceedings had begun and Williams's right to counsel
had attached, the Court held that the government violated Massiah when
detectives deliberately elicited incriminating statements from him.43 While
sidestepping the issue concerning the meaning of "interrogation," the Court
highlighted the point at which the right to counsel attaches under the Sixth
Amendment, stating that "a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after
the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him-'whether by
way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment.'""
The Court subsequently decided several cases, perhaps inconsistently given
their factual similarity, holding that government use of a defendant's cellmate as
an informant violated the Brewer rule,4" but that the use of a similarly situated

40. Id. at 205 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)) (omissions and
alterations in original). Although the absence of direct interrogation in Massiah distinguishes
it from Spano:
[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to both surreptitious informant
elicitations and overt official interrogations. The three conditions essential for a
"critical stage" in surreptitious investigation situations are: (1) the initiation of
formal proceedings; (2) a government informant's active, deliberate elicitation;
and (3) government knowledge that it is exploiting a situation in which its
informant is likely to elicit inculpatory statements from a defendant. When these
conditions exist, Massiah bars government use at trial of an accused's
incriminating statements given without counsel's assistance.
James J. Tomkovicz, An Adversary System Defense of the Right to Counsel Against
Informants: Truth, FairPlay, and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 21-22
(1988) (citations omitted).
41. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
42. Id. at 389-93.
43. Id. at 401.
44. Id. at 398 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
45. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:291

cellmate did not violate the rule if he remained only a "passive listener."46 The
Court further held, in Maine v. Moulton,4 7 that even if the defendant initiates
communication with a governmental informant, the government violates the Sixth
Amendment as long as the government "must have known" that its agent-here,
Moulton's co-defendant-was likely to elicit incriminating statements from the
defendant without counsel present.48 Concerned with the state's ability to
conduct investigations and uncover crime, the Court noted that priorto initiation
of adversary proceedings, at which point the right to counsel attaches for the
particular offense charged, the state may use at trial uncounseled incriminating
statements obtained by government agents without violating the Sixth
Amendment.49
The Court gave the Sixth Amendment right to counsel its most expansive
reading in Michigan v. Jackson.50 There, the defendants had waived their
Miranda rights and made confessions to detectives after arraignment. In
invalidating the confessions, the Court relied on the critical distinclion that
adversarial proceedings against the defendants had already begun and defendants
had invoked their right to counsel at their arraignments. Before defendants had
the opportunity to consult with counsel, however, the police initiated the
interrogation which produced the confessions. Although the defendants had
agreed to proceed with the post-arraignment interrogations outside the presence
of their attorneys, the Court held that "if police initiate interrogation after a
defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to
counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated
interrogation is invalid."'" This case seems to confuse Fifth and Sixth
Amendment issues, and indeed, the Court's statements evidence concern
regarding coercion of defendants; the Court nonetheless rested its holding
squarely on the Sixth Amendment. The Court did, however, rely on the Edwards
rule regarding suspect-initiation of contact with police to buttress its conclusion.
In addition, the Court emphasized the language in Moulton that the Sixth
Amendment ensures a suspect "the right to rely on counsel as a 'medium'
between him and the State" after the state has formally charged a suspect.52 The
Court underscored the breadth of this right, beyond the Fifth Amendment context
of custodial interrogation, when it noted:
[A]fter a formal accusation has been made-and a person who had previously
been just a "suspect" has become an "accused" within the meaning of the
Sixth Amendment-the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is of

46. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
47. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
48. Id. at 174-75, 176 n.12.
49. Id. at 180 n. 16. In addition, the Court noted that "to exclude evidence pertaining to
charges as to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time the
evidence was obtained, simply because other charges were pending at the time, would
unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest in the investigation of criminal activities." Id. at
180.
50. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
51.Id.at 636.
52. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176.
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such importance that the police may no longer employ techniques for eliciting
information from an uncounseled defendant that
53 might have been entirely
proper at an earlier stage of their investigation.
Undoubtedly concerned with not impeding law enforcement efforts, the Court
subsequently backed away from the Jackson bright-line rule that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel automatically attaches after formal proceedings
begin by requiring the accused to invoke the right. Thus, in Patterson v.
Illinois,54 the Court held that police-initiated interrogation after the right to
counsel attaches, and after commencement of formal proceedings against the
suspect, does not violate the Sixth Amendment ifhe does not invoke his right to
counsel and he properly executes a Miranda waiver. 5 Thus, once an accused has
invoked this Sixth Amendment right to counsel, at arraignment or some other

triggering formal proceeding, the police may not approach the defendant even
once to ask if he would like to waive the right to counsel, unlike the Miranda
context where police have that one opportunity.
Some commentators have criticized Patterson, however, for severely
undercutting the Sixth Amendment right to counsel:
[T]he Patterson Court bases the right to counsel on the fortuity of whether
the accused has either requested counsel or whether counsel has been
appointed on his behalf. This rationale is at variance with . . . Sixth
Amendment ... principles... [which] interpose counsel as a "medium"
between the prosecution and the accused once formal proceedings begin..
56

The Patterson dissent underscored this point when it noted that "counsel must
be furnished whether or not the accused requested the appointment of counsel."57
Notwithstanding such criticism, the Court in Pattersonseemingly watered down

the waiver restrictions built up in Jackson, and thereby seemingly confused the
Miranda and the Massiah rights to counsel.

Further clouding the Fifth and Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel doctrines,
the Court in Michigan v. Harvey58 allowed the prosecution to use the fruits of
Massiah violations for impeachment purposes. The Harvey Court's approach to

the right to counsel has been criticized, however, as undermining the adversary
system:
Because the Sixth Amendment promotes fair process trial norms that differ
from the values the Fifth Amendment fosters, the reasoning supporting
Harvey is suspect.... [T]he right to counsel is designed to assist the accused
when he is "confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy
of the public prosecutor." This guarantee, being necessary in all parts of a
trial, not just in the prosecution's case-in-chief, should not be circumscribed.
Again, the restriction outlined in Harvey weakens the adversary system to the

53. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 632.
54. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
55. Id. at 300.
56. Garcia, supra note 33, at 73.
57. Patterson,487 U.S. at 301 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Camley v. Cochran, 369
U.S. 506, 513 (1962)).
58. 494 U.S. 344 (1990).
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extent that it prevents the defendant from relying on counsel as a "medium
between him and the State."59

C. The Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights: An Overview
In practice, the right to counsel under the Miranda and Massiah doctrines
attaches at different points and protects different interests. Miranda protections
apply, in custodial interrogations, to prevent police attempts to get defendants to
incriminate themselves in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Miranda, thus,
requires that police apprise suspects of their right to counsel and demands
exclusion of incriminating statements from the prosecution's case-in-chief when
police have not respected a suspect's unambiguous request for assistance of
counsel. Although police get one chance, after apprising an accused of his rights,
to ask the suspect if he would like to waive those rights, Edwards prevents the
police from initiating further questioning regarding any offense after the suspect
invokes his Miranda right to counsel; however, the suspect may subsequently
waive this right to counsel by initiating contact with the police and voluntarily,
"knowingly and intelligently" waiving his Mirandarights.
While the Court has vacillated over whether the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel under Massiah attaches automatically without a suspect's invocation,
once a suspect invokes the right at arraignment, the right to counsel applies with
equal force in judicial proceedings and extra-judicial proceedings. Moreover, this
right applies to both overt interrogations by police and to surreptitious
elicitations through the aid of informants. Unlike the Miranda context, after
invocation of the right to counsel, police do not get even one chance to approach
the defendant on his own and inquire whether he wishes to waive the right. Thus,
for any offense with which a suspect has been formally charged, neither the
police nor police informants may question the suspect without counsel present,
unless the suspect knowingly and intelligently waives his right.6"
II. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN JAPAN

In Japan, the right to counsel attaches at different times than in the United
States, and Japanese courts restrict that right to effectuate their criminal process
goals. As in the United States, the Japanese Constitution guarantees criminal
suspects the right to counsel. That the rights are textually similar should surprise
no one, since the primary impetus behind Japan's adoption of its most recent

59. Garcia, supranote 33, at 74 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.
300, 309 (1973) and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)).
60. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (It is "incumbent upon the State to
prove 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."' (quoting
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938))); Farretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)
(noting that where a defendant relinquishes his rights, "the accused must 'knowingly and
intelligently' forgo those relinquished benefits").
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constitution came from the United States.6 Also unsurprising, given the different
historical and cultural forces in each country, is that the Japanese courts interpret
their remarkably similar textual provisions quite differently.
The primary basis for the right to counsel in Japan is found in two provisions
dealing with two different contexts: first, Article 34 of the Japanese Constitution
(given effect in accordance with Article 39(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
("CCP")); and second, Article 37 of the Japanese Constitution. Article 34 of the
Japanese Constitution and Article 39 of the CCP together address the right to
counsel in the context of arrest and detention, while Article 37 addresses access
to counsel regardless of an accused's wealth.
As a preliminary matter, Article 38 of the Japanese Constitution states that,
"[n]o person shall be compelled to testify against himself."62 Unlike the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, however, Japanese courts do not interpret
this right to grant a right to the presence of counsel during interrogation.63 When
one understands the heightened role that confession-both for its evidentiary and
rehabilitative value-plays in the Japanese criminal justice system, 6 one can see
why police and prosecutors wish to keep defense counsel out of the interrogation
room. Still, police and prosecutors in the United States feel the same way about
confessions, at least with regard to their evidentiary value; yet the U.S. Supreme
Court does not accord similar deference regarding interrogation methods.65

61. Percy R. Luney, Jr., Introduction in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at vi (Percy R.

Luney &Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993) (describing the Japanese constitution as "a document
imposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP)," which oversaw the
Occupation of Japan for the Allies immediately following World War II). Additionally, "[t]he
fact that the Occupation was overwhelmingly American meant that the American democratic
tradition provided the political and psychological coloration of the Occupation." John M. Maki,
The Constitution ofJapan: Pacifism, PopularSovereignty, and FundamentalHuman Rights,
in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra, at 49.
62. KENPO [Constitution] art. 38 (Japan). Article 38 also includes that: "(2) Confession
made under compulsion, torture or threat, or after prolonged arrest or detention shall not be
admitted in evidence. (3) No person shall be convicted or punished in cases where the only
proof against him is his own confession." Id.
63. Notably, although Japanese defendants have the right to remain silent, few can or
choose to do so: 85-90% of suspects indicted fully confess guilt, and the remaining 10% or so
confess factual guilt but resist confessing moral responsibility. See Daniel H. Foote, The
Benevolent PaternalismofJapanese CriminalJustice, 80 CAL. L. REv. 317, 336-37 (1992);
see also A. DIDRICK CASTBERG, JAPANESE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 58 (1990). For confessions in
Japan to be admissible, they must be "voluntary"; although as some scholars have noted, courts
deem confessions inadmissible only when they doubt the "reliability" of the confession or guilt
of the suspect. Ryuichi Hirano, Diagnosis of the Current Code of Criminal Procedure,
translatedin 22 LAW INJAPAN 129, 135-38 (1989). Aside from the potential "voluntariness"
inquiry regarding an accused's confession, Japanese courts have not developed aMiranda-type
prophylactic rule to give effect to that right. This lack of a prophylactic rule stems partly from
the view that investigations are not part of the "trial" proper, to which the right to counsel
applies, and partly from the primacy the system places on defendant confessions which are
necessary to correct and rehabilitate offenders. See Foote, supra,at 337.
64. Foote, supra note 63, at 337.
65. Comparepart II of this Note with the text accompanying notes 65-69.
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Although the language of these constitutional provisions gives the impression
that defendants enjoy quite expansive access to counsel from the time of arrest
or detention through trial, this is patently not the case. Several factors limit
defendants' access to counsel, including: Supreme Court rulings interpreting the
right narrowly; the CCP, which grants prosecution broad discretion to limit such
access; and popular support for the current system, which vests great trust and
discretion in police and prosecutors.
A. Article 34 of the Japanese Constitutionand Article 39
of the Code of CriminalProcedure
It is misleading to analogize Japan's Article 34 right to counsel in the arrest
and pre-indictment context to the Miranda pre-indictment context in the United
States. First, a Japanese suspect does not have a right to have counsel present
during interrogation.66 Second, the right to meet with defense counsel to discuss
case strategy is highly circumscribed as compared to the American right. 67 To
appreciate fully the contours of the right to counsel under Article 34, one must
first understand the procedural context in which the right attaches.
1. Procedural Context in Which the Right to Counsel
Exists
In the Japanese system, two types of police custody exist: that which is
involuntary requiring formal arrest procedures; and that which is "voluntary,"
whereby police may question suspects without formal arrest. The right to counsel
only attaches during formal arrest, while no right to counsel exists for those who
voluntarily accompany the police. This Note's discussion of Article 34 rests on
the assumption that a formal arrest has occurred.
Formal arrest procedures, addressed in the CCP, allow for a maximum seventytwo hour period of suspect confinement following arrest.68 First, police may hold
a suspect in custody for forty-eight hours, after which time police must release
him or transfer his case to the prosecutor's office.69 Within twenty-four hours
after receiving the case, the prosecutor's office must decide whether to petition
the court in order to detain the suspect 7" for a period of up to ten days, with a
possible extension of up to ten more days. 7' Thus, "[a] suspect assigned to...

66. "Counsel are never permitted to attend interrogation sessions." Foote, supra note 63,
at 60.
67. Compare, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (citing Geders v.
United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976), for the proposition that a "bar on attorney-client
consultation during overnight recess" violates the right to effective assistance of counsel
because it interferes with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to
conduct the defense) with Baba v. Japan, infranote 85 and accompanying text.
68. Takeo Ishimatsu, Are CriminalDefendants in JapanTruly Receiving Trialsby Judges?,
translatedin 22 LAw IN JAPAN 143, 147 (1989).
69. KEISOHO [Code of Criminal Procedure], Law no. 131 of 1948, § 203 (Japan).
70. Id. § 205.
71. Id. §§ 207, 208.
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detention remains in the physical custody of the police from the point of arrest
to the point of indictment, a period which may be as long as twenty-three days."72
In reality, however, police may contact and question a suspect for a much
longer period than the twenty-three days which the CCP allows. As in the United
States, police may speak with suspects and witnesses prior to arrest without
implicating any constitutional rights. While U.S. citizens usually draw a line at
some relatively early point during police questioning and require the police to
make an arrest if they wish to continue any further questioning, in Japan, people
"voluntarily accompany" the police and submit to questioning, sometimes for
days, without ever triggering formal arrest.73 Although suspects are not legally
bound to remain in police custody prior to arrest, the stigma surrounding formal
arrest, and the fact that police usually have enough evidence to arrest and detain
a suspect anyway, usually lead suspects to remain in police custody until released
by the police.74 At no time during this "voluntary" process, however, does a
suspect's right to counsel attach. In this way, police shield themselves from
potential constitutional scrutiny for overreaching their official powers. As will
become evident below, "[t]he Supreme Court [has been] generally reluctant to
'
elaborate rules in regulating criminal investigation."75
Thus, "[t]he majority of
the accused go through the investigation process without legal advice and...
court-appointed counsels [sic] come to defend them only after incriminating
evidence is secured by the prosecution."'76
2. Prosecutorial Discretion as It Affects the Quantity77 of
Access to Counsel Under Article 34
Just as police have discretionary power, prosecutors exercise a great deal more
discretion and control over cases than the law explicitly allows, and certainly
more than their American counterparts. In addition to possessing the discretion

72. Frank Bennett Jr., PretrialDetention in Japan: Overview and IntroductoryNote, 23
LAW INJAPAN 67 (1990).
73. Foote, supranote 63, at 345 n.172. Professor Foote recounts the story of one person
who "voluntarily" accompanied the police for questioning for four days without ever triggering
formal arrest and the attendant right to counsel; he was interrogated in the police quarters from
early in the morning until late in the evening all four days.
74. Id. at 344-45.
75. Masayuki Murayama, Post War Trends in the Administration of Japanese Criminal
Justice: Lenient but Intolerant or Something Else?, 4 J. JAPAN-NETHERLANDS INST. 221
(1992).
76. Id. at 252. Professor Foote notes that "[c]ounsel are never permitted to attend
interrogation sessions," and further adds that "[tjhe role of the adversary process-and even
the formal trial itself-remains highly circumscribed." Foote, supranote 63, at 338.
77. "Quantity" refers to when, and for how long, attorneys and suspects may meet. See
supranotes 66-70 and accompanying text. While police and prosecutors may place stringent
limits on such access to counsel in Japan, similar restrictions would likely run afoul of the Sixth
Amendment right in the United States. See supra note 67.
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to decide whether to further detain suspects,7" during suspect detention
prosecutors may also decide whether to indict and prosecute or to suspend
prosecution. Moreover, the prosecutor exercises great discretion in the access
suspects have to their counsel.79
Within this procedural context, Japanese courts interpret Article 34 of the
Japanese Constitution, which states that "[n]o person shall be arrested or
detained without.., immediate privilege of counsel,"8 very narrowly As such,
courts have determined that "[t]he right to court-appointed counsel does not
attach until after indictment,"" even though Article 34 uses the language of
"arrest" and "detention." As explained above, the timing of this right to counsel,
in form, does not differ substantially from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
under the Massiah doctrine.13 The substance of the right to counsel afforded a
defendant differs tremendously, however, because Article 39, section 3, of the
CCP grants police and prosecutors discretion to control a defendant's access to
counsel during the pre-indictment period:
The public prosecutor, public prosecutor's assistant office, and judicial police
official .. may, when it is necessary for investigation, designate the date,
place, and time of interview and delivery or receipt of [documents or other
things] only prior to the institution of prosecution, provided that such
designation does not unreasonably hold the suspect in check when he
exercises his rights for the defense.84
The following two appellate court cases give some idea of what the Code
means by "unreasonable." In the 1950 case of Baba v. Japan,"the Sapporo High
Court found that the prosecutor acted reasonably in allowing defense counsel [to
meet with the suspect] twenty minutes on the third day of a ten day detention, and
thirty minutes each on the eighth, and ninth days." 5 But the Japanese Supreme
Court, in the 1953 decision of Hongo v. Japan, "found that police restriction of
access to a detained suspect of two or three minutes was inadequate."86 Professor
Shigemitsu Dando, a prominent scholar of Japanese criminal procedure, also
noted that the Supreme Court has "held that it was not an improper limitation
even though the interview [between counsel and defendant] was not permitted
until the same day that prosecution was instituted." 7 Accordingly, the U.S. State
Department Human Rights Report describes access to counsel in Japan thus,
"[t]he Criminal Procedure Code grants the prosecution and investigating police

78. Prosecutors request detention for 85% of suspects referred to them, and 99.7% of
prosecution requests for additional detention are granted, amounting to de facto authority to
detain suspects. See Foote, supra note 63, at 58-59.
79. CASTBERG, supra note 63, at 55-73; see also JOHN 0. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT
POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 121-138 (1991).
80. KENPO [Constitution] art. 34 (Japan).
81. Foote, supra note 63, at 55.
82. Bennett, supra note 72, at 68.

83. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
84. KEISOHO [Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 39(3) (Japan) (emphasis added).
85. CASTBERG, supra note 63, at 76-77 (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 77.
87. SHIGEMITsU DANDO, JAPANESE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 122 n.25 (1965)

(decision of April 20, 1955, 54 Hanreijiho 1423).
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officials the power to control access to attorneys before indictment when deemed
necessary for the sake of the investigation."88 Such power to limit defendant's
access to counsel for the "sake of the investigation" contrasts sharply with the
picture of access to counsel in the United States described above.
B. Article 37 Right to Counsel
Article 37 is the other constitutional provision which addresses the right to
counsel in Japan. In relevant part, it reads:
In all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial by an impartial tribunal .... At all times the accused shall have the
assistance of competent counsel who shall, if the accused is unable to secure
the same by his own efforts, be assigned to his use by the State. 9
While the right to counsel appears in the right-to-trial provision of the Japanese
Constitution, it does not approximate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, nor
does it rest on the same "fair process" and "dignitary" concerns that infuse Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence in the United States. The primary focus of this
provision concerns the right to counsel regardless of a person's ability to pay.
Article 36 of the CCP reads:
Where the accused is unable to select a defense counsel for poverty or some
other reason, the court shall assign defense counsel on behalf of the accused
upon his request. However, this shall not apply where defense counsel has
been selected for him by some person other than the accused.90
Putting aside the structural barriers to full realization of this equal access to
counsel, 9 this Note accepts the U.S. State Department report's finding that
"[s]ome local bar associations provide detainees with a free counseling session
prior to indictment. Counsel is provided at government expense after indictment
if the arrested person cannot afford one."92 Although equal access to counsel
regardless of wealth is an important aspect of such a right, such concerns do not
substantively provide defendants with access to counsel. The fact that the
constitution entitles everybody to the same right of counsel is small consolation
given the formal limitations of that right in practice.
Thus, the formal role of counsel in Japan is highly circumscribed, especially
with regard to a defendant's right to access. Even assuming that every suspect
who wishes representation of counsel receives it, no defendant may have an
attorney present during interrogation. Furthermore, police and prosecutors limit
suspect-attorney meetings with respect to time and duration so as not to interfere
with ongoing investigations. Though not discussed above, similar restrictions

88. JapanHuman Rights Practices,1994, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, March 1995 [hereinafter
Human Rights Report].
89. KENPO [Constitution] art. 37 (Japan). Article 36 of the CCP implements art. 37.
90. KEISOHO [Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 36 (Japan).
91. For example, extremely few people pass the Japanese bar exam equivalent: Of those
who do, most practice in urban areas unevenly spread out across the country; and relatively few
Japanese attorneys practice criminal law. HALEY, supra note 79, at 83-121.
92. Human Rights Report, supra note 88.
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exist regarding discovery. Any evidence that will not be introduced at trial,
including exculpatory information, is non-discoverable.93 Castberg notes that:
This is a particular problem because defense attorneys almost without
exception lack the resources to conduct extensive investigations of their
clients' cases, whereas prosecutors have the full resources of the police as
well as their own offices. Prosecutors respond that some evidence is very
sensitive and can damage the criminal justice system if revealed.94
This does not mean that Japanese defense attorneys play no role within the
criminal justice system. They play a significant informal role. For example, they
contact a victim's family to make apologies and offer restitution, and they
encourage their clients to make formal apologies, which play a role in getting
prosecutors not to prosecute and in mitigating post-conviction sentences. Far
from the American ideal of defense counsel as the unbridled advocate for his
client-interposed at every "critical stage" between the police and the
defendant-the Japanese defense attorney sometimes looks more like an
advocate for the state, at least with regard to the truth-seeking function of the
investigatory process. The fact that defense counsel plays a more vibrant role for
defendants informally, however, means more in Japan where informal
institutions take on greater importance.

III. A COMPARISON OF THE ROLES THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
PLAYS IN THE U.S. AND JAPANESE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS

This Part examines why the right to counsel in the United States and Japan
differs so much, This part of the analysis entails looking at the broader objectives
of each system and the respective roles criminal procedure-specifically the right
to counsel-play in each. Specifically, the different treatment each country gives
to the right to counsel demonstrates a fundamentally different approach to
criminal justice. Simplistically viewed, the United States, with its dichotomized
approach to criminal justice, views "law enforcement interests" and the
"individual-suspect's interests" as diametrically opposed. Viewed in such a way,
any procedural protection conferred on the individual necessarily impedes
effective law enforcement. Similarly, any procedural protection granted the
authorities is viewed as a loss to the individual. Rarely does a lawyer, judge,
policeman, or prosecutor suggest that the state's investigation serves the interests
of both sides.
On the other side of the Pacific, Japan gives police and prosecutors great
discretion in their treatment of criminal suspects and defendants. If one accepts
for the most part Professor Foote's view of Japan's criminal justice system as a
"benevolent paternalism model,"95 Japan seems to operate at the other side of the
"rights" spectrum entirely. The Japanese investigative manner yields almost
unbelievable clearance rates, confession rates, and conviction rates. Japanese

93. CASTBERG, supra

note 63, at 77.

94. Id.
95. Foote, supra note 63.
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police, prosecutors, judges, and many defense lawyers accept that "getting at the
truth," which includes a suspect's or defendant's confession, is in the interest of
both society and the individual. The system demands confession, partly for its
evidentiary value and partly for its correctional value. Society views confessions,
in the absence of counsel, as necessary to effect what Foote calls "specific
prevention" (a process which emphasizes rehabilitation, reintegration, and the
prevention of recidivism).96 It is hard for Americans to believe that Japan
achieves these statistics without significant deprivation of individual freedom,
and indeed, that assumption is true in a procedural sense. Accepting Professor
Foote's benevolent paternalism metaphor, there are some pretty ugly aspects to
living in such an authoritarian "family" structure.
What Americans might fail to see, however, is that the Japanese system
ultimately aims to "correct" offenders, not merely to determine guilt and punish
them. The Japanese system thereby adds to the freedom which both individual
offender and society enjoy. With this criminal justice goal in mind, any obstacle
to determinations of guilt-which includes interposing an attorney at every
interrogation-presumptively hinders a defendant from accepting responsibility
for a crime, increases society's retributive desires, and inhibits acceptance and
reentry of the defendant into society.
This Note does not suggest that we should import facets of Japan's approach
to the right to counsel. Comparing the right to counsel in Japan to that in the
United States, however, highlights the issue of whether American criminal
jurisprudence has perhaps over-emphasized the adversarial nature of the
American process at the expense of rehabilitating and reintegrating a defendant
into society. Keeping in mind the original justifications for the American right
to counsel, which include fair process and dignitary norms fostered by adversary
proceedings, Part III.A first examines U.S. criminal justice goals, and second
whether we in the United States implement the right to counsel in accordance
with these goals. Part III.B similarly analyzes the fit between the Japanese right
to counsel and Japanese criminal justice goals.
A. The American Right to Counsel Within the Broader
CriminalJustice System
No serious discussion of the right to counsel, either under the Fifth or Sixth
Amendment, should proceed without first establishing the functions which it, and
criminal procedure generally, serve. Professor Peter Arenella, relying on
Professor Packer's famous Due Process/Crime Control Models, notes that the
American criminal justice system has conflicting objectives.97 He identifies three
principle "functions" which the procedural system serves:
First, criminal procedure must provide a process that vindicates substantive
criminal law goals. This procedural mechanism must determine substantive
guilt reliably, authoritatively, and in a manner that promotes the criminal

96. Id. at 348; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
97. Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts' CompetingIdeologies, 72 GEo. L.J. 185, 197 (1983).
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law's sentencing objectives. Second, criminal procedure must provide a
dispute resolution mechanism that allocates scarce resources efficiently and
that distributes power among state officials. Finally, criminal procedure can
perform a legitimation function by resolving state-citizen disputes in a
manner that commands the community's respect for the fairness of its
processes as well as the reliability of its outcomes.9"
In order for criminal procedure, and individual facets such as the right to
counsel, to be effective, it must accord with these three functions. While the right
to counsel implicates all of these functions, this Note emphasizes the
"vindication" and "legitimation" functions, because these two functions interact
with the right to counsel in ways that starkly contrast with the way the Japanese
view the role of counsel in their society.
1. How the Right to Counsel in the United States
Vindicates Substantive Criminal Law
At an intuitive level, one would think that interposing counsel between police
and the suspect or defendant during interrogation would only impede effective
fact-finding. In turn, this impediment would undermine the vindication of
"substantive criminal law goals" such as determining a suspect's guilt, or at least
getting information which would help police "solve" the crime at hand. Although
this supposition is true in a sense, police interrogation and investigative factfinding form but one part of the overall process of guilt determination in the
United States. As the cases discussed above indicate, trials play a more central
role in guilt determinations. Although the facts which police discover are
important, vindicating substantive criminal law goals requires more than simple
fact-finding: "the substantive criminal law's definition of guilt protects
individual autonomy and preserves the moral force of the criminal sanction by
requiring some showing of the defendant's moral culpability"99 by the state in a
court of law.
Beyond "reliable historical fact-reconstruction and moral evaluation,"'0 0 the
vindication function requires heightened proof requirements. "At least in theory,
our system prefers erroneous acquittals over erroneous convictions ... [and]
criminal procedure deliberately places the risk of factual error on the state to
protect the integrity and moral force of a guilty verdict."'' While it is clear that
not every system needs this built-in bias against the state, nor gives effect to the
concepts of "integrity" and "moral force" in the same manner, part of "guilt" in
the U.S. criminal justice system includes the imperative that the state determine
guilt by procedurally correct means. But this begs the essential question: what
procedures render a guilt determination correct? In the United States,
constitutionally-correct procedures require a "fair trial" with effective assistance
of counsel for the defendant.

98. Id. at 188.
99. Id. at 197.
100. Id. at 198.
101. Id. The historical reasons for this preference are briefly discussed below, but essentially
stem from a combination of distrust of government and severity of punishment.
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As the Court stated in Gideon v. Wainwright: 2
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have
laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to
assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands
equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man
charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.' °3
Thus, whereas other systems, Japan's included, place less emphasis on trials as
the forum for determining guilt; in the United States, vindicating substantive
criminal law-determining guilt-can only be ensured if counsel is made
available.
Professor Garcia has concisely pointed out the underlying rationale and role
of a trial in the U.S. criminal justice system: "[Gideon was] founded on an
adversarial clash between two relatively equal sides whose conflicting interests
allegedly produce an accurate result."''" Thus, it is not the police and prosecutors
alone who determine guilt, but at a trial where each side vigorously questions the
other side's evidence to produce the ultimate "truth." And, as Gideon makes
clear, vindication of truth at trial is not possible without a meaningful right to
counsel.
This result, affirmed in earlier cases," 5 has served as the guiding theme
throughout Massiah and its progeny. 6 The Court, explaining the historical
significance of the right to counsel in Farrettav. California, ' quoted Zephanian
Swift in one of the first American colonial treatises on law:
[I]t is apparent to the least consideration, that a court can never furnish a
person accused of a crime with the advice, and assistance necessary to make
his defense .... Our ancestors.., denied counsel to prisoners to plead for
them to any thing but points of law. It is manifest that there is as much
necessityfor counsel to investigate matters offact, as points of law, iftruth
is to be discovered."8
Lest one believe that the investigative function of counsel is merely
perfunctory, U.S. courts do overturn guilty verdicts on ineffectiveness of counsel
grounds due to failure to investigate. The Eighth Circuit stated, in Hawkman v.
Parratt,°9 "ordinarily a reasonably competent attorney will conduct an in-depth
investigation of the case which includes an independent interviewing of the
witnesses.""' In this case, the defense counsel limited his investigation of the
case to "discussing the case with petitioner, securing and reviewing state

102. 72 U.S. 335 (1963).
at 344. The Court went on to hold that the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of
103. Id.
counsel applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
104. Garcia, supra note 33, at 49-50 (footnote omitted).
105. See e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932) (holding that due process of law requires that, in capital cases, it is the duty of the court
to provide counsel to a defendant who is incapable of making his own defense).
106. See supra notes 33-59 and accompanying text.
107. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
108. Id. at 827-28 n.35 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting from 2 Z. SwiFT, A
SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, 398-99 (1796)).
109. 661 F.2d 1161 (1981).
110. Id. at 1168 (citation omitted).
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investigation materials, ... and contacting the deputy sheriff who was called to
the scene.""' Given that eyewitnesses saw events which could have provided the
defendant with a viable defense, counsel's conduct fell below minimum
professional standards for effectiveness of counsel required by the Sixth
Amendment.
Such standards again highlight the fact that the trial serves as the forum in
which one's guilt or innocence is conclusively established. Police and
prosecutorial authorities do not alone perform the task of fact-finding; for even
if they alone possess the means to obtain evidentiary information, defense
counsel must reexamine that evidence and vigorously question it to arrive at the
truth. Ideally, defense counsel independently investigates the facts in building its
defense. In reality, the state has far greater resources at its disposal to craft a
compelling case against the accused.
The right to counsel should address this imbalance in resources if the
defendant is to receive a fair trial. As the Court eloquently noted in Powell:
The right to be heard [at trial] would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel .... [The defendant] is
incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is
good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid
of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence.... He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. 12
Furthermore, this principle served as the justification ultimately leading up to the
Massiah and Jackson Courts' holdings that police, either directly or indirectly,
may not approach the defendant to seek waiver of this Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. Recognition of diametrically opposed interests, with the life or liberty
of a defendant at stake, rightly or wrongly has contributed to the implacably
hostile positions of state versus the individual. And, though the complexity-oftrial concerns do not motivate the Court's Fifth Amendment jurisprudence in the
right-to-counsel area, concern over a defendant's self-incrimination and
protection against coercive conduct on the part of police do. Beyond fair process
in the Sixth Amendment sense-that prosecution and defense testing of evidence
in adversarial proceedings will produce an accurate result-it is the firm belief
that government itself should not break the laws in the pursuit of justice that
serves the vindication
function. In the United States, how we determine guilt is
3
important."

111. Id.

112. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (emphasis added).
113. Justice Brandeis spoke eloquently about criminal process integrity in a Fourth
Amendment case, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928):
If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that
in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare
that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a
private criminal-would bring terrible retribution.
Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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While we are daily inundated with stories of criminal defense attorneys
obstructing truth by vigorously advocating their clients' defense, sometimes
advising them to remain silent, the ideal of our system includes the notion that
the state must be able to prove its case without the help of the individual who
faces harsh punishment-the defendant. There are, however, limits to the means
which counsel may employ in defense of his client. Lawyers are also "officers
of the court."
In Nix v. Whiteside," 4 the Court held that the right to effective assistance of
counsel is not contravened if defense counsel refuses to help the defendant
commit perjury at trial. As explained below with regard to the "legitimation
function" of criminal procedure, defense counsel owes his client a duty of
loyalty. This duty, however, is not absolute. "[C]ounsel is precluded from taking
steps or in any way assisting the client in presenting false evidence or otherwise
violating the law."".5 Essentially, this rule rests on the Court's belief that denial
of counsel's aid in committing perjury "is consistent with the governance of trial
conduct in what we have long called 'a search for truth."' 6 The trial serves as
the forum where guilt or innocence is established," 7 and defense counsel must
vigorously defend his client while not willfully obstructingthe searchfor truth.
Thus, at least ideally, our criminal procedure best serves the function of
vindicating substantive criminal law goals by providing a mechanism-the trial
at which counsel vigorously represents the defendant-that determines guilt
reliably and authoritatively. Part of the reliability and authority, again, rests on
the idea that the defense counsel serves two masters, the defendant and the truth.
As Nix shows, when the two clash, the truth should prevail even if at the expense
of the defendant's liberty which might otherwise be secured through deceit
(perjury).
2. How the Right to Counsel in the United States
Performs a Legitimation Function
In addition to vindicating substantive criminal law goals, the right to counsel
must also "perform a legitimation function by resolving state-citizen disputes in
a manner that commands the community's respect for the fairness of its processes
as well as the reliability of its outcomes."". 8 The right to counsel in the United

114. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
115. Id. at 166.
116. Id. at 171.
117. Of course, the defendant enters court cloaked with a presumption of innocence:
The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of
criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions
resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the
presumption of innocence-that bedrock "axiomatic and elementary" principle
whose "enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal
law."
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453
(1895)).
118. Arenella, supra note 97, at 188 (footnote omitted).
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States serves this legitimation function perhaps even better than, and at a cost to,
the vindication function discussed above:
The legitimation role of resolving state-citizen disputes in a fair manner is
inextricably tied to the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel clause.
Principally, the clause fosters respect for the system by guaranteeing
"procedural fairness" and by "ensuring formal equality of access to the
system." Additionally, [it] promotes the defendant's meaningful participation
in the inner workings of the system. Rather than being treated as an object of
the process, a defendant represented by knowledgeable counsel is accorded
dignity and respect." 9
A defendant, therefore, benefits from fair process and dignity, norms that
legitimate the criminal justice system. He is made to feel a part of the process
which potentially exposes him to harsh penalties. While there are limits,
demonstrated by the Nix decision above, the defendant must receive "effective"
assistance of counsel and not merely superficial presence of counsel. As the
Court noted in Strickland,"[the] Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and
is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial .... For that
reason, . . . 'the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of
counsel."" 20
Thus, government-imposed measures that limit the vigorousness of counsel are
unconstitutional. 2 ' Moreover, failure on the part of defense counsel to meet
certain performance standards can deprive the defendant of effective assistance
of counsel and thereby fail to pass constitutional muster. Although wary of
establishing constitutional guidelines which counsel must follow, the Court has
laid down some basic obligations that defense counsel owes a defendant, both to
make the adversarial contestfair, and in no small part, to give effect to dignitary
norms: "Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties.
Counsel[] ...owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of
interest[,] ... [a] duty to advocate the defendant's cause[,] ...to consult with the
defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of
important developments....
Although deficiency in any one of these dutieswill not alone lead a court to set
aside a trial result,123 taken together these deficiencies give a flavor of the manner

119. Garcia, supra note 33, at 59 (footnotes omitted).
120. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-86 (1984) (citations omitted) (citing
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)).
121. See, e.g., Geders v. U.S., 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (holding a bar on attorney-client
consultation during overnight recess unconstitutional); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853
(1975) (holding bar on summation at bench trial unconstitutional); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406
U.S. 605 (1972) (holding a requirement that a defendant testify first, or not at all,
unconstitutional); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961) (holding a bar on direct
examination of defendant unconstitutional).
122. Strickland,466 U.S. at 688.
123. The test to determine effectiveness of assistance of counsel has two parts. The first
looks into the performance of counsel to see whether counsel, generally speaking, lived up to
the duties discussed above; if he did not, the second looks to whether counsel's failure was
"prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution."
Id. at 692.
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in which a defendant participates in the process, and thereby, the process's
ultimate fairness and dignity. Further, the dignitary norms find expression in a
defendant's ability to forgo representation entirely.
As the Court stated in Faretta,2 4 the Sixth Amendment does not provide
merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants the accused
personally the right to make his own defense. The Sixth Amendment grants the
accused directly the right to a defense, for it is he who suffers the consequences
if the defense fails. From this logic, the Court went on to conclude that the
"Framers selected in the Sixth Amendment a form of words that necessarily
implies the right of self-representation."'" This notion accords strongly with the
overarching fair process and dignitary norms effectuated by the Sixth and Fifth
Amendment rights to counsel. Undergirding these "rights" is the strong
preference that the defendant should have the ultimate freedom to exercise or
dispense with his rights when faced with the full panoply of state power. As the
Faretta Court further noted, "[f]reedom of choice is not a stranger to the
constitutional design of procedural protections for a defendant in a criminal
proceeding."' 26 This freedom of choice also serves the legitimation function of
criminal procedure.
What emerges, therefore, is a picture of the right to assistance of counsel as it
relates to the overall functions of criminal procedure. Counsel rights vindicate
the substantive criminal law goal of determining guilt in our adversarial system
because we view guilt not as a mere question of fact, but as a mixed question of
fact, law, and moral culpability only after tested in our adversarial waters.'
There is no doubt that there are other valiol ways to determine guilt, but the
validity of those other ways rests on different cultural assumptions. For example,
in countries that view guilt as an objective factual question to be determined
solely by certain investigatory state agents, the right to counsel would play a
significantly diminished role and would not add to, but merely obscure, the truth
determination.
Furthermore, although the right to assistance of counsel occasionally creates
tension with the determination of substantive guilt, the U.S. approach was born
of its own historical and cultural experiences. As Garcia explains: "[T]he right
to counsel significantly advances 'fair process' and 'dignitary' norms that.., are
not necessarily consonant with achieving an accurate result. Indeed, . . . both
norms may hinder the determination of factual guilt because they reflect the
policy values of a system premised upon suspicion of unlimited governmental
power." 128

124. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
125. Id. at 832.
126. Id. at 835 n.45.
127. This Note ignores the more problematic issue of plea-bargaining. Some people argue
that the plea-bargaining system too serves the adversarial function. Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea
BargainingAs Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969 (1992). Others contend that the plea system
merely undermines the criminal law's substantive goals. See Arenella, supra note 97, at 218219.
128. Garcia, supra note 33, at 59.
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Unlike civil law systems which view government as father or family, the
United States was born of a quite different idea:
The American revolution, as understood by the Court in Bridges v.
California,was accomplished to get Government off the backs of the people.
The Bill of Rights... was devised as a means of guaranteeing individual
rights against a mistrusted government. Government was viewed not as a
sibling, but as "big brother," an enemy, and a dangerous enemy at that.
...
The accused is viewed, not as a member of the family, but as an outlaw.
A basic feature of the accusatorial system is distrust of government and
officials. Punishment and deterrence are its primary goals. Rehabilitation and
education are lofty ends, but thought too broad, difficult, and expensive to
achieve.29

Given the historical suspicion with which Americans view government and the
built-in procedural protections designed to emphasize fairness at trial, such as the
right to counsel, one can see the importance which formal processes attain.
Additionally, in the United States, the mediating institutions of family, company,
church, and friends do not provide strong informal social control mechanisms.
Against this backdrop, formal processes take on added importance. As explored
more at length below, Japan's history and culture do not view state power with
such suspicion, and the mediating institutions of family, company, and friends
play a large role in controlling aberrant behavior. These differences help explain
the various roles that counsel plays in each society.
Having examined how the right to counsel ideally fits into and serves the
criminal process in the United States, this Note next examines that same right in
Japan. Again, any evaluation of rights such as these cannot be divorced from the
cultural and historical processes that lead to their development. Consequently,
any change must ultimately accord with each society's value system. Through
comparison, however, we learn to requestion some basic assumptions and relearn
why society's criminal processes accord with society-at-large.
B. The JapaneseRight to Counsel Within the Broader
CriminalJustice System
Although discussed within the context of the United States, the framework for
analyzing the right to counsel and criminal process, generally, applies equally for
any country. 3 ' Simply put, the criminal process must: (1) vindicate the
substantive criminal law goals by "determin[ing] substantive guilt reliably,

129. Louis M. Natali, Jr. & Edward D. Ohlbaum, Redrafling the Due ProcessModel: The
Preventive Detention Blueprint,62 TEMP. L. REV. 1225, 1257-58 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
130. The purpose here is not to view Japan's criminal procedure-and the right to counsel
therein-through a U.S. lens which reflexively points out the relative weakness of defense
counsel in Japan and declares the system morally bankrupt. As noted above, the rights afforded
citizens in society must make sense to that society. By the same token, this Note does not
compare the relative roles of counsel with an eye towards implementation of Japan's approach.
Comparative analysis helps the student of comparative models gain better insight into why the
rights take the form they do and how each might achieve a better fit within its own system.
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authoritatively, and in a manner that promotes the criminal law's sentencing
objectives"; (2) "provide a dispute resolution mechanism that allocates scarce
resources efficiently and that distributes power among state officials"; and (3)
"perform a legitimation function by resolving state-citizen disputes in a manner
that commands the community's respect for the fairness of its processes as well
as the reliability of its outcomes...'
This Note emphasizes the "vindication" and "legitimation" functions of
criminal procedure because it is with regard to these two functions that the
differences between U.S. and Japanese criminal procedure emerge. One must,
however, first understand the heightened importance of informal over formal
mechanisms of social control. Japanese society relies heavily on informal social
control to ensure that individuals do not act in ways-including commission of
crimes-that undermine the cohesion, harmony, safety, and success of society at
large. As Professor Haley notes, "by depending upon informal social mechanisms
for crime control, the Japanese state has in effect abandoned the most coercive
of all legitimate instruments of state control. In contemporary Japan these powers
thus reside with the society at large and its constituent, lesser communities of
family, firm, and friends."'
This informal control alters tremendously the expectations society has for its
police, prosecutors, judges, and lawyers. There are very real differences between
a society like Japan, which expects institutional power structures-police, courts,
prisons-to handle aberrant behavior largely informally while reservingformal
punishment as a last resort, and a society like the United States which does not.
One gets a sense that a society that controls behavior through informal means
would view everything from procedure to punishment differently than we do in
the United States. Again, Haley points out that:
[Official, formal] penalties... were perhaps never as important as the simple
community sanction of ostracism and expulsion, especially when joined with
vicarious liability. Social control develops new dimensions when landlords
are made responsible for the conduct of their tenants, village headmen for the
activities of the village at large, or parents for the conduct of their children,
and when expulsion from the community and its sustaining resources is an
ever-present threat.'
This subtextual understanding of informal social control in Japan informs and
changes the very meaning (from a U.S. perspective) of what constitutes
"legitimate procedure." For example, the mechanisms of informal social control
prevent vast amounts of anti-social behavior, or at least deal with it internally
once committed, such that the overall crime rate is lower and the defendants in
those cases that make their way into formal channels are presumed guilty. While
this perhaps overstates the case, suspects indictedby prosecutors reach that stage
based on a higher quantum of evidence than necessary for arrestees in the United

131. Arenella, supra note 97, at 188 (footnotes omitted).
132. HALEY, supranote 79, at 138.
133. Id. at 170 (emphasis added).

INDIA NA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:291

States.' 34 This presumption, in turn, leads to the different societal expectations
that Japan has with regard to police and prosecutorial handling of a defendant.
Japanese society expects a suspect to confess, repent, and make restitution. In a
similar fashion, courts play a guilt-confirmation role rather than a guiltdetermination role. Such emphasis on informal social control also leads defense
counsel to play a role largely outside of the guilt-determination phase, but
nonetheless serves a vindication and legitimation function by obtaining the most
favorable result possible for the defendant.
In addition, a system with such formal-informal control interplay ultimately
reinforces itself and reaffirms those informal mechanisms which in turn
strengthen social relationships and structures in society: "The inability of the
formal legal system in Japan to provide effective relief, to impose meaningful
sanctions, thus tends to buttress the cohesion of groups and the lesser
communities of Japanese society and to contribute to the endurance of vertical,
patron-client relationships."' 35 As long as criminal procedure effects this
outcome in Japan, it accords with the overall values and beliefs of Japanese
society and thereby serves valid ends.' 36
1. How the Right to Counsel in Japan Vindicates
Substantive Criminal Law Goals
If there is one area where Japanese authorities seem to excel, it is in their
apparent ability to suppress crime and solve criminal cases when they occur. As
Professor Bennett explains:
The Japanese criminal justice system presses ever closer to, as it were,
perfection. Clearance rates.., improved from 69.4% of reported cases in
1982 to 73.5% of reported cases in 1987.... Prosecutorial performance has
pressed to the inevitable plateau awaiting all percentages, improving from a
98.25% rate of conviction in 1949 until today an indicted suspect has literally
but one chance in a thousand of avoiding conviction.' 37
Such statistics have led Japanese criminal procedure scholar Ryuichi Hirano to
declare Japan's criminal procedure "abnormal" and "diseased."'3 He bases such
remarks, at least in part, on the observation that "courts in Japan are 'places that
confirm that the defendant is guilty' rather than "'places that determine whether
the defendant is guilty or innocent."" 39 Before passing on the validity of such
statements, one must delve into the manner in which the authorities determine
guilt in Japan. From Hirano's statement above, however, it is apparent that there

134. Hirano, supra note 63, at 130 ("Courts in Japan are 'places that confirm that the
defendant is guilty' rather than "places that determine whether the defendant is guilty or
innocent.").
135. HALEY, supra note 79, at 180.
136. The system has a dark side, too, in the form of the extra-legal unchallengeable influence
that groups have over individuals. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
137. Bennett, supra note 72, at 67 (footnote omitted).
138. Hirano, supra note 63, at 129.
139. Id.
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is no vibrant adversary system with courts of first instance playing a strong role
in guilt determination.
"When an individual comes under suspicion of criminal conduct, the
authorities [police and prosecutors] have wide discretion to investigate."14
Although there is a warrant requirement textually similar to our own, Japanese
courts interpret it to provide police with broad exceptions so as not to inhibit
police investigation of crimes.' 4 ' Searches and seizures do not provide the
greatest source of evidence implicating a suspect. "For Japanese investigators,
...the questioning of suspected criminals is considerably more important than
searches and seizures.... Japanese police and prosecutors possess broad powers
for preindictment interrogation."' 42 As mentioned above, the preindictment arrest
and detention may last up to twenty-three days with no serious court oversight.'4 4
Although courts do not convict defendants based solely on their confessions,
it is clear that confessions and suspect-defendant statements play a central role
in any case that proceeds to trial. 45 Although there are several purposes for
which police elicit confessions, here we are primarily concerned with the
evidentiary value in helping police and prosecutors determine guilt.
Given the manner in which trials are conducted, Japanese Judge Takeo
Ishimatsu views Japanese prosecutors as de facto judges. In a speech Judge
Ishimatsu gave, he decried the "trial by dossier" system, whereby defendants are
tried almost entirely based on evidence that prosecutors pass to judges in
documentary form. He described the guilt-determination system thus:
[T]rial by dossier . . .may be thought of in the following manner:
Prosecutors, police and other investigators question victims, witnesses and
other related persons, or undertake inspections. . . . Having thereby
established their hunches... as investigators.., they then undertake long
and thorough.., questioning of the suspects... [and] pursue confessions
corresponding to the investigators' hunches ....They then put the results of
the investigation, including these [uncounseled] statements, in order in
accordance with their own hunches... and record and solidify those results
in a detailed dossier ....[In addition,] a few articles of real evidence that
have been seized by the investigators [are also admitted]. If this evidence is
accepted, a guilty verdict can immediately be issued.'
On the basis of the dossier alone, courts can, and for the vast majority of cases
do, convict defendants. "Further evidence against a defendant is almost never

140. Foote, supra note 63, at 333.
141. Id. at 333-34.
142. Id. at 334 (footnote omitted).
143. See Ishimatsu, supra note 68, at 149. Ishimatsu explained, "with respect to
preindictment detention judges are deprived ofjust about any chance to concern themselves
with the treatment of suspects; releases that constitute a cancellation of detention are carried
out on the sole determination of the prosecutors themselves." Id.
144. HALEY, supra note 79, at 132.
145. As mentioned above, the Japanese criminal justice system places great emphasis on
confessions for more than just their evidentiary value. Defendant-confession and expression
of genuine remorse lead to lenient treatment by the government and serve a rehabilitative and
correctional purpose. See supratext accompanying notes 64-65.
146. Ishimatsu, supra note 68, at 146-47.
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added at trial. Rather, the only new evidence is exculpatory evidence aimed at
undercutting the results of the investigation."' 47
This process means, essentially, that trials in Japan do not serve the factfinding function that they do in the United States. Nor does defense counsel
vigorously question the evidence which investigating authorities have developed
and admitted to the judge. As Judge Ishimatsu explained: "criminal trials-and
in particular the fact-finding that lies at the heart of trials-are conducted in
closed rooms by the investigators, and the proceedings in open court are merely
a formal ceremony."' 48
Thus, in the formal criminal justice sphere, Japanese defense counsel plays a
very limited role: they may not attend interrogations, during which police and
prosecutors gather confessions which lead to more physical evidence. If one
accepts the view of prosecutors as judge and fact-finder, there is a certain logic
to preventing counsel access to interrogation sessions. It would be the equivalent
of interposing counsel between judge and defendant in a U.S. court setting. In
Japan, defense attorneys have an opportunity to challenge the admissibility of a
confession on the grounds that it was not voluntary, but this challenge rarely
succeeds. As Professor Hirano points out, "[w]hen the contents of the confession
comport with other evidence and are accurate, [interrogation] questioning is not
called into question."'4 And, even when a confession itself is thrown out, other
evidence obtained as a result of that confession will remain admissible and
support a conviction.' Thus, with regard to fact-finding and investigations, the
defense counsel does not play much of a formal role.
That noted, one does not understand why a defendant's right to counsel is
highly circumscribed until one comprehends that investigators, prosecutors, and
judges prize confessions for their "correctional" value:
A fundamental aim of the criminal process in Japan is correction, not just
determination of guilt or punishment of the offender. Law enforcement
officials at all levels tend to share this objective.... Thus, their roles are not
confined to the formal tasks of apprehending, prosecuting, and adjudicating.
Rather once personally convinced that a suspect is an offender, their concern
for evidentiary proof of guilt shifts to a concern over the suspect's attitude
and prospects for rehabilitation and reintegration into society, including
acceptance of authority. Leniency is considered an appropriate response if the
correctional process has begun.' 5 '
The contrast between the U.S. and Japanese approaches to vindicating the
substantive criminal law goal of determining guilt appears striking to students of
American criminal process. In the United States, judges and juries determine
guilt based on evidence adduced at trial, which the prosecutor and defense

147. Hirano, supra note 63, at 135-36.
148. Ishimatsu, supra note 68, at 143.
149. Hirano, supra note 63, at 137.
150. See, e.g., Abe v. Japan, 20 Keishu 6 at 537, Supreme Court, Second Petty Bench, I July
1966 (Court held that prosecutor's promise to suspend prosecution in exchange for confession
rendered defendant's confession inadmissable at trial. The Court upheld Abe's conviction,
however, because other evidence existed sufficient to support the conviction.); see also Foote,
supra note 63, at 337.
151. HALEY, supra note 79, at 133.
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counsel vigorously support or challenge. Society places a premium on procedural
correctness because of how severely it can affect the evidentiary record and,
thus, the ultimate outcome of the trial. Only after a court in the United States
finds a defendant guilty can the punishment or correctional process begin.
By contrast, guilt determination in Japan is a highly factual inquiry by police
and prosecutors. They possess great discretion to pursue almost any line of
evidence, producing investigations unhobbled by the procedural constraints
found in the United States. Furthermore, correctional purposes infect the
investigation and guilt-determination phases.' 52
The early introduction of correctional purposes into investigatory stages
further explains the limitations on the formal right to counsel in Japan. Defense
counsel in the United States add, in principle, to the determination of guilt; the
defendant must have meaningful access to counsel to investigate facts
independently and question the prosecution's evidence before a neutral factfinder. Punishment or correction cannot constitutionally begin until after the
prosecution proves the defendant's guilt. In Japan, correction begins when the
prosecuting authorities believe in a defendant's guilt and elicit a confession.
Japanese authorities view a confession as a "means [of] getting the suspect to
accept moral responsibility,"' 53 the starting point for rehabilitation. This
approach leads to different emphases in the counsel rights of defendants.
Looking to the U.S. model, Japanese citizens, policy-makers, and criminal justice
authorities naturally believe that the presence of counsel at interrogations would
reduce the number and quality of confessions, which would not only result in
fewer successful prosecutions, but in a less efficacious correction process.
Simply put, any barrier to confession would impede defendants from taking
moral responsibility and hinder their reentry into society.
Less procedure, of course, means less procedural protection for innocent
suspects and defendants. Given the heavy reliance on confession, police and
prosecutors are under a lot of pressure to get suspects to confess once they are
convinced of a suspect's guilt.'54 As has been shown, few defendants actually get
relief from conviction, even if their confessions are involuntary, as long as they
are reliable.' To counteract this concern, individuals wrongfully prosecuted, or
even indicted, may sue for damages. There is no real viable protection for an
innocent suspect, however, at least at the front end of an investigation, unless the
authorities themselves believe that the suspect is innocent.
Thus, unlike the U.S. system where defense attorneys ideally play an active
role in vindicating substantive criminal law goals by helping determine guilt or
innocence at trial, in Japan, counsel plays an extremely limited role. Defense
counsel in Japan may even encourage his client to plead guilty, much as an

152. In effect, this creates a "presumption of guilt" as soon as the police and prosecutor
believe the defendant is guilty.
153. Foote, supra note 63, at 337.
154. HALEY, supra note 79, at 131. Moreover, "obtaining a confession becomes a primary
aim in all investigations, and as a result, police detectives emphasize the necessity for direct
interrogation of suspects and... detention before arrest." Id. at 131-32.
155. Foote, supra note 63, at 337.
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American attorney would at plea-bargaining stages, which in turn might lead to
a reduced sentence or suspension of prosecution.' 56
Although the defendant's right to counsel is highly circumscribed with regard
to the vindication function of criminal procedure, the defense counsel in Japan
serves a legitimation function in the informal criminal justice system and in the
informal extra-judicial system of social control.
2. How the Right to Counsel Performs a Legitimation
Function in Japan
Although innocent suspects whom authorities believe are guilty do not receive
procedural protections, such as the right to deal with authorities through counsel
as in the United States, in the long run, guilty suspects can benefit greatly from
the Japanese system. "Prevailing societal values in Japan, whatever the historical
origin, do encourage the use of confession and, more important, permit a lenient
response."' 57 Though defense counsel play a limited role in the formal system,
within the informal context Japanese defense counsel play their most vibrant
role.
As discussed above in the U.S. context, the right to counsel "perform[s] a
legitimation function by resolving state-citizen disputes in a manner that
commands the community's respect for the fairness of its processes as well as the
reliability of its outcomes."' 58 This function, however, need not be purely within
the formal criminal justice system. That is especially true for a country like
Japan, which relies heavily on informal mechanisms for social control and
permits police and prosecutors a great deal of discretion.
"[T]he primary role of the defense attorney [in Japan] is in the pre- and posttrial stages of the criminal process, in working for suspension of prosecution or
for leniency in sentencing, and in appealing cases where a perceived injustice has
taken place."' 59 The role that victims play in the system demonstrates the truth of
this statement. "Restitution is ordinarily made and the victim has a voice in the
authorities' decisions whether to report, to prosecute, or to sentence the
offender." 6 ' Although it is ultimately the authorities' decision whether or not to
prosecute, defense counsel works with the defendant to contact all parties
involved, make restitution, and convince victims to support lenient disposition.
If the charge is fairly serious, for example rape or murder, and the authorities
press forward with prosecution, "the role of the defense attorney becomes one
of persuading the judge to impose a lenient sentence . . . [by] effectively
present[ing] factors in mitigation of the offense .... The defense attorney...

156. In the Abe case discussed above, supra note 150, defense counsel told the defendant:
"[I]f you have indeed [committed the crime], you should admit it. You will be much better off
to admit it quickly than to hurt yourself by continuing to talk foolishness." HIROSHI ITOH &
LAWRENCE WARD BEER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS, 1961-70 at 167 (1978).

157. HALEY, supra note 79, at 135.

158. Arenella, supranote 97, at 188 (footnote omitted).
159. CASTBERG, supra note 63, at 82.
160. HALEY, supra note 79, at 130.
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serves as an advisor to the defendant as well, suggesting.., how best to make
restitution and to show remorse.''
Given Japan's pervasive informal control mechanisms, the informal sphere of
operation for defense counsel is deceptively great. By U.S. formalistic standards,
the role of defense counsel seems inadequate, and the plight of presumed-guilty
defendants seems equally hopeless. The reality, measured in terms of final
disposition, is quite different due to the leniency with which most courts treat
defendants:
Japan is extraordinarily lenient. Large numbers of offenders identified by the
police are never reported as suspects to the procuracy. Of those reported,
most are convictable. Yet the vast majority are allowed to take advantage of
summary proceedings that result in minor fines equivalent to a few hundred
dollars. For many others prosecution is routinely suspended... [and of those
convicted] sentences are generally suspended in more than half of all cases.'62
This predisposition towards leniency translates into more viable operating room
for defense counsel than one would notice when looking only at the formal,
procedural context in which authorities handle defendants.'63 Defense counsel,
thus, serve the legitimation function by helping resolve state-citizen disputes,
while at the same time helping to smooth defendants' reentry into community,
family, and firm. This reintegration of defendants into society, in turn, reinforces
those informal social control mechanisms because authorities only reintegrate
offenders when they believe the informal social controls will prevent future
aberrant behavior. In this way, criminal procedure accords with the values,
beliefs, and structures in society.
In sum, the right to counsel in Japan does serve the vindication function of
criminal law, but in a quite different way than in the United States. Because
police and prosecutors, rather than courts, determine a defendant's guilt and rely
heavily on confessions for their evidentiary and correctional value, a right to
vigorous counsel during the formal investigation would undermine the
substantive correctional goal which inheres early in the process. Since the
Japanese view correction as the primary and ultimate goal, the right to counsel
serves to vindicate substantive criminal law largely by remaining outside the
formal investigation. The absence of defense counsel from investigations,
however, obviously results in quite serious risks of coercion to both innocent and
guilty suspects. For the Japanese, lenient treatment after confession offsets the
serious threat to individual liberty where procedural protections are lacking. In
the case of the innocent defendant, the system's reliance on weak procedural
protection and early correction of suspected offenders amounts to a lose-lose
proposition. But Japanese society does not view the authorities or their

161. CASTBERG, supra note 63, at 79 (footnote omitted).
162. HALEY, supra note 79, at 129.
163. This author has not, however, found statistics which explain the extent to which-by
percentage of cases-defense counsel plays an integral role in negotiating with victims and
authorities for more lenient treatment. This Note concerns the functions which the right to
counsel plays in the criminal justice system and assumes that there is a great deal more
operating room for defense counsel informally-both in society-at-large and in those areas
where authorities exercise extra-legal discretion-than in the formal system.
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procedures with such distrust. Whereas people in the United States view defense
counsel as important to preserve the integrity of the guilt-determination phase,
"it is probably safe to say that the view that trials by investigators are proper has
solid support among the people of Japan."' 64
The right to counsel in Japan also performs a legitimation function, though in
informal settings, with more efficacy than at first is apparent. Given police and
prosecutorial discretion to drop cases and suspend prosecution, defense counsel
has a very real chance to help his client while at the same time legitimizing the
system which trusts the authorities with such autonomy. Furthermore, the right
to counsel legitimizes the informal social control mechanisms by reinforcing the
primacy of community-group control. Defense counsel helps legitimate Japan's
system by playing the role of intermediary between victim, offender, law
enforcement authorities, and the community, firm, and family to which a guilty
defendant will return.
Just as the right to counsel in the United States serves functions of a criminal
justice system which grew out of its own particular history, the same is true of
Japan. Whereas the adversarial system and the right to counsel in the United
States stem from a distrust of government power, Japan's current system stems
from a history which trusts government. Part of this trust rests on a history of
relative group autonomy. As long as groups'65 maintained internal harmony, there
was no need for the state to exert control over members of the group. 66 The
Japanese also have trust that their government is a guarantor of freedom, not a
power which takes freedom away. As noted in a Joint Declaration by Japan's
Commission on the Constitution:
[T]he nation and state power itself have come to the point where they are
structured democratically. State power in itself is not antagonistic to
individual rights and freedoms, rather, it is in a position to become their most
powerful guarantor ... state power makes manifest to the maximum degree
the rights and freedoms of the individual members of the nation. 67
This trust in authority is evident throughout Japan's criminal justice system and
in its criminal processes. Professor Foote describes Japan's criminal justice
system as a benevolent-paternalism model. It is benevolent insofar as the goal is
not merely to punish but to correct offenders. "[T]he term 'benevolence'...
refers to an underlying orientation toward specific prevention. The goal of a
benevolent system is to achieve reformation and reintegration when possible

164. Ishimatsu, supra note 68, at 146.
165. "Groups" in this context refers to social groupings along hamlet or village lines, in the
past, and more current social groupings such as family and firm today.
166. Concern for autonomy and the perception of outside intervention as a threat is
another widely recognized characteristic of Japanese organizational behavior..
. Collective rather than individual action enhances the ability of the individual
to achieve such freedom from governmental control and, in the process of the
subordination of individual interests to the group.., each [group] "has virtually
complete autonomy."
HALEY, supra note 79, at 176-77 (citation omitted).
167. JAPAN'S CoMMIssION ONTHE CONsTrrUTION: THE FINAL REPORT 273-74 (John M. Maki
trans. & ed., 1980).
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through lenient sanctions tailored to the individual circumstances of the
offender."'168 The system is "paternalistic" in that it "depends on great trust in
public officials,
for it vests great discretion in them at nearly all stages of the
69

system."1

As demonstrated above, this system characterized by benevolent-paternalism
has wide support among the populace, resulting in part from society's heavy
reliance on informal mechanisms of control which reduce the need for
institutional or formal interference, and in part from society's general belief that
government protects but does not inherently threaten individual autonomy. But
where paternalism takes this form and "reigns supreme over every stage of the
process[,] ... defense counsel plays no more than a limited role .... ."7 Giving
that much discretion and trust to officials can, and does, lead to significant
intrusions into personal autonomy. This intrusiveness does not alter the fact that
the right to counsel in Japan, like the right to counsel in the United States, does
serve the vindication and legitimation functions of criminal justice in that
society.
IV. LESSONS LEARNED

Comparing the role of defense counsel in Japan and in the United States
demonstrates that the textually similar "rights" differ significantly in practice.
They protect different interests, each seeming to its own society to be in the best
interest of the individual and society as a whole.
The United States, with its adversarial system and in-trial guilt determinations,
ideally gives criminal defendants the right to counsel to protect them from
coercive custodial interrogations, to add prophylactic protection to the right
against self-incrimination, and to protect the integrity of trialby balancing power
between defendant and state. The system is premised on a distrust of government
power and focuses on the threat to individual liberty. Such concerns seem natural
to U.S. citizens-especially those citizens who belong to groups which police
traditionally target-who live in a society where the state holds a virtual
monopoly on coercive power.
Japan, on the other hand, gives its citizens a very limited formal right to
counsel. Defense attorneys' activities in Japan find greater expression in the
informal negotiating and mediating role between guilty offender, law
enforcement authorities, and the communities to which the offender will return.
This role is natural to the Japanese who trust their officials to make accurate guilt
determinations and begin the correctional process as soon as possible, even
before reaching trial. Where the informal system of control predominates in
Japan, the defense counsel can do his client the most practical good by helping
smooth the guilty offender's reentry into the informal social structure.

168. Foote, supranote 63, at 363.
169. Id. at 360.
170. Id. at 361.
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A. Who Has It Right?
Many authors, scholars, and students who compare cultures often look for
aspects which each country can transplant "back home" to fix this or that
problem. Given the numerous failures the U.S. criminal justice system has
experienced in controlling crime, Japan indeed looks alluring with its low crime
rates and high conviction rates. No other industrialized democracy can boast
Japan's statistics on crime control. This Note has examined the right to counsel
in each country, not with an eye towards borrowing specific tools to control
crime, but to elucidate some of the reasons why each country implements certain
rights and the form they take. Such a study reminds society of the history and
social structures which produced those rights and, by doing so, helps society
reevaluate whether changes in the implementation of such rights are desirable.
The yardstick for measuring the desirability for change must always remain the
society from which the rights emerged and to which they will apply.
As for the question of "who has it right," there is no clear cut answer. Each
country benefits from a reevaluation of some of its criminal processes, based on
an examination of what the other society does. With that in mind, the following
discussion attempts to draw some lessons to the fore.
B. Lessons for the United States
First, this Part suggests some specific changes to the way the United States
implements the right to counsel, reflecting the lessons above but which accord
with our underlying adversarial philosophy. While this Note has not focused
much attention on what happens to offenders once convicted, there can be no
doubt that the American criminal justice system is much more punitive than
Japan's. Examining the right to counsel as it relates to both the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments highlights a pervasive theme: that the state holds a monopoly on
coercive authority and implements the coercive aspects of that monopoly in ways
which Americans believe require limits on the authority to do so. The limit on
authority to punish does not stop the state from instituting extremely harsh
penalties, but merely requires that the state follow certain procedures which
reliably guarantee society that they are punishing the correct person. Hence, the
system has certain built-in biases and presumptions against the state.
But is severe punishment the best approach? If the goal is to deter crime,
instituting severe punishments has not succeeded. Though we incarcerate
offenders at extremely high rates, we do not have a correspondingly lower rate
of crime. One criminologist has described the current prison system in the
following way:
These abominable and unjust institutions do not effectively protect citizens
from criminality but instead provoke new criminality by making inmates less
fit to live in society than they had been before incarceration. It has been
known for ages that prisons are superb schools for criminal education. They
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most certainly do not deter crime; they stigmatize offenders and are,
economically speaking, a disaster.'
This view has wide support. The problem of crime stems from a wide range of
social phenomena and goes far beyond the criminal justice system's ability to
contain it. Although public opinion polls routinely rank "fear of crime" as the top
concern of citizens, 72 the amount of "getting tough on crime" by Congress, state
legislatures, or courts does not seem to effectively reduce crime by
commensurate rates.
While this topic exceeds the scope of this Note, the right-to-counsel analysis
above has demonstrated that aspects of Japan's system offer an alternative model
regarding the punitiveness of harsh prison sentences. As shown above, Japan has
two effective crime control systems: one formal, another informal. In Japan,
defense counsel has the opportunity to participate much more vigorously in the
informal system. That informal system, as shown above, serves to reinforce
Japan's formal system in ways which allow it to focus on specific prevention
rather than punishment. Although homogeneity, low poverty rates, low
unemployment rates, and high literacy rates all undoubtedly contribute to lower
crime generally, the informal social control mechanisms of family, firm, and
friends add tremendously to deterrence and prevention of crime. American
society overemphasizes the role of government (making detailed regulations,
serving as arbitrator between citizens, controlling aberrant behavior) and formal
process, relying on it to the exclusion of informal social mechanisms. This
overemphasis on government solutions may in fact deprive society of its informal
institutions which reinforce the goals and messages of the formal system. There
is only so much that society can accomplish through its formal governmental
institutions.
The lack of strong informal social control mechanisms, and reliance instead on
formal government processes obviously has had benefits, such as civil rights for
many people who previously suffered systematic discrimination. But there has
also been a withdrawal, perhaps not totally unrelated to government's increased
presence (and people's reliance on it), of informal social groupings who
previously dealt with aberrant behavior on their own. Although there are
certainly negative aspects to relying on informal social control,'73 for example,
subjugation of individual autonomy to the group, Japan demonstrates that there
are benefits for crime control that are worth studying.
As for the formal criminal justice system, Japan offers alluring correctional
aspects. The U.S. system is extremely punitive and does not seem to correct

171. HERMAN BIANCHI, JUSTICE AS SANCTUARY: TOWARDS A NEW SYSTEM OF CRIME
CONTROL at viii (1994). Bianchi argues for new modes of thinking when addressing problems

of crime control. Several of his ideas resemble aspects of the Japanese system: bringing victims
into the process concerning restitution and offender disposition, establishing processes which
recognize offender remorse, and working to reform, rather than merely punish, offenders.
172. See Tom Morganthau et al., The Lull Before the Storm?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 4, 1995, at
40 (noting that the majority of Americans routinely list crime as one of their most important
concerns).
173. The "dark side" of unchecked informal social control is discussed below. See infra note
179-80 and accompanying text.
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offenders once they find their way into the system. Japan more effectively
corrects offenders and reintegrates them back into their communities which, as
already discussed, helps to maintain order and reduce future aberrant behavior.
Japan has remarkable recidivism rates. 74 Part of Japan's recidivism rates may be
attributable to the leniency with which Japan treats suspects and defendants after
they confess; and part of such rates may be attributable to good prediction by
authorities based on offender characteristics (age, family relations, employment,
past criminal history, etc.). In either event, the statistics are noteworthy for the
simple fact that they demonstrate that a society can be lenient in the way it
punishes offenders and still enjoy reduced crime and recidivism. Analyzing the
right to counsel in Japan has highlighted the different approach that Japan takes
from the United States in offender disposition. Although beyond the scope of this
Note, Japan's success at low recidivism, while maintaining a lenient environment
at disposition, should lead all Americans, not just policy makers, to reevaluate
some basic assumptions about the causes of crime, the benefits of healthy nongovernmental mediating institutions such as family, firm, church, and friends in
suppressing aberrant behavior, and the relationship between punishment, crime
control, and deterrence.
More directly applicable and within the scope of this Note, however, there are
some aspects of the U.S. right-to-counsel jurisprudence which need reevaluation
in light of the analysis above. Here, courts need to consider the philosophical and
practical underpinnings of the adversarial system, and to evaluate whether the
right to counsel serves those animating premises.
As previously explained, the Fifth Amendment right to counsel grew out of
concerns about coercion in custodial settings and violations of the privilege
against self-incrimination stemming from that coercion. Police may still question
suspects after apprising them of their rights, but they must get a voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent waiver before using evidence in the prosecution's casein-chief.'75 The Supreme Court has balanced concerns with coercion in crafting
the Mirandarules in a way that does not unduly limit the ability of authorities to

174. A Ministry of Justice study found that:
Recidivism, as defined by criminal conviction within three years, increased with the
severity of the initial disposition, but remained less than 50 percent in all categories
except upon release after incarceration for the term of the sentence. The aggregate
rates by disposition were as follows: suspension of prosecution-1 1.5 percent;
fines-1 6.3 percent; suspension of execution or sentence--21.5 percent; suspension
of execution of sentence with probation-35.4 percent; release by parole-44.5
percent; and release after termination of sentence-57.2 percent.
HALEY, supra note 79, at 136 (citations omitted).
175. Evidence is admissible for impeachment use, however, if taken in violation of Miranda.
Some scholars, in calling for Miranda's overruling, have noted that Miranda lacks
constitutional basis and, thus, exceeds its authority to craft mere prophylactic rules which bind
state courts. JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESsIONs, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 173-98 (1993). Others

argue that allowing police any use of statements taken in violation of Miranda encourages
police to ignore its mandate. Again, this Note does not explore the reality of damage to a
defendant who takes the stand in his own defense after incriminating statements have been
taken in violation of Miranda.Emphasis is given to waiver standards and potential for policedefendant interaction.
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speak with a suspect or for a suspect to waive his rights and speak with
authorities.
Although no hard statistics exist to prove it, Japan's system seems to
demonstrate that there may be something to the tfuism that "confession is good
for the soul." As noted above, Japanese authorities place great emphasis on
confessions for both their evidentiary and correctional value. While the United
States would not wish to import the methods Japanese authorities use to elicit
such confessions,' 76 at a minimum, the U.S. should create an atmosphere
conducive to making confession for offenders inclined to do so.
For that reason, the Miranda-Edwardsapproach-apprise suspects of their
right to silence and counsel, while allowing police to ask if they wish to waive
these rights-seems to walk the appropriate line between respect for the
suspect's free will and the investigators' desire for helpful information. It allows
the suspect to make an informed decision about whether to speak to the police.
Case law such as Farrettaemphasizes this lesson and accords with historical
concerns.
By contrast, the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, especially under the Jackson
rule, seems to go beyond the point where the defendant is given an opportunity
to take advantage of adversarial proceedings, and in fact encourages him to do
so. Jackson held that after formal proceedings have begun and a defendant has
invoked his right to counsel, police may not approach the defendant to seek
waiver or to ask any questions. As noted above, concerns for fairness of trial and
the dignity with which the government treats defendants motivates Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence. Our system prizes equality; Fifth and Sixth
Amendment cases recognize that equality and fairness can be compromised
before trial. Courts determine guilt, based not just on simple facts, but on a
combination of facts, including moral culpability, and procedural correctness.
That noted, Japan's approach demonstrates, at least for guilty offenders, that
repentance, acceptance of authority, and perhaps restitution, help ease an
offender's conscience and his path back into society. Again, while the United
States would not countenance the procedural environment in which Japanese
authorities obtain confessions, the United States does not want to unnecessarily
inhibit a defendant who experiences feelings of remorse from coming forward.
Confession would redound to his benefit, perhaps in a reduced sentence, and
perhaps in simple psychological relief for having made an apology.
The problem with the Jackson rule, as experience demonstrates, is that once
a defendant meets with his attorney, at least in the earliest stages of investigation,
the attorney is likely to tell his client to exercise his right to remain silent. 77 Such

176. Again, this fear of coercion goes back to the issue of trust in authorities and the
perception that checks need to be placed on police-especially in "inherently compelling"
custodial settings-to preserve a defendant's right against self-incrimination and involuntary
confessions. This concern is highlighted among certain sub-groups in society who perceive
themselves as the object of undue police attention to begin with. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
177. "[A]ny lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no
statement to police under any circumstances." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949). As
demonstrated in the Strickland line of cases above, supranote 67, part of the defense counsel's
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advice naturally tends to encourage defendants, even guilty defendants with
feelings of remorse, to take a more adversarial position than perhaps they
otherwise would.
Imagine this scenario under Jackson: A person commits a crime, or commits
an act accidentally which looks like a crime. Out of fear of the harsh penalties he
may face, he remains silent at first, even through the Miranda custodial
interrogation setting. Eventually, police gather just enough information to indict
him. At arraignment, the (now) defendant invokes his right to counsel under the
Sixth Amendment. At this point, the police are not allowed to ask him whether
he would like to talk, nor whether he would like to waive his rights to counsel
and silence and explain the circumstances. Suppose this defendant, no longer in
the frightening custodial setting where he first invoked his rights, feels remorse
for his actions (purposeful or accidental). If he were otherwise inclined, but
simply too timid to approach police himself, his attorney would most likely not
support such a move. The attorney would give advice which is more likely to
make the defendant further solidify his nascent adversarial position.
This strategy may very well lead, ultimately, to some plea agreement which
would not significantly differ from a scenario where he went to the police
immediately. But it may not. Police may become more convinced of his guilt, or
at least that he is hiding something. Such perceptions might, naturally, lead
police to investigate the incident in ways which conform to those misperceptions.
Facts and evidence do not explain themselves; at times, people view evidence
differently depending on their preconceptions. Given this scenario, the inability
of police to ask the defendant, even once after arraignment, if he would like to
speak with them could harm him. In this way, Jackson may harm both the
defendant's long term best interests and society's as well. This hypothetical may
seem fanciful: people may argue that it gives police too much credit because they
investigate only to confirm guilt and frequently disregard exculpatory evidence;
or that it underestimates the ability of a defendant to simply seek out the police
for more questioning and to make a confession, which he may do under Jackson.
Such criticism misses the point that Jackson pushes a defendant who might be
wavering or confused into an adversarial position which could hurt him from
both an evidentiary and a confessional (in the remorse-sense of the word)
standpoint. A better approach would allow the defendant to invoke his Sixth
Amendment right, but then allow the authorities their one chance to approach
him and see if he wishes to talk. Maintaining the Johnson waiver standards-that
waiver must be "knowing and intelligent"-affords the remorseful-butintimidated defendant both the protection of his rights and the opportunity to
clear his conscience.' Such an approach not only implements the kinder lessons

role includes conducting an independent investigation. It is logical to conclude that until an
attorney has done some investigating, the prudent attorney will advise the defendant to remain
silent, lest any statement be used against him in some manner.
178. This opportunity to clear one's conscience, as Japan's approach demonstrates, could
lead to many beneficial results: a defendant's sense of absolution; a defendant's ability to clear
up police misperceptions, thereby giving investigating authorities a different perspective from
which to view evidence, which, in turn, may lead to a less harsh disposition. While federal
courts and many state courts are bound by sentencing guidelines, there is room for imposition
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of Japan's system, but does so in a way that substantially accords with the
animating premise of Fifth and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence: respect for
individual dignity, fair treatment, free will, and the desire to make the adversarial
processes available,not mandatory.
C. Lessonsfor Japan
Having examined some of the lessons from Japan's formal and informal
criminal justice system, Japan, too, might benefit from a good look at America's
approach. The following discussion, like that above dealing with the United
States, examines the concepts and ideas which animate Japanese criminal process
generally, and then suggests particular modifications to Japan's right to counsel
specifically.
This Note has utilized Professor Foote's benevolent-paternalism model as a
framework for discussing Japan's criminal justice system. The examination, until
this point, proceeded from a neutral, nonjudgmental perspective. Although the
"benevolent" emphasis on specific prevention clearly holds lessons for the
United States, Japan might benefit from asking itself some tough questions about
the "paternalistic" aspects, both in the formal and informal systems which
reinforce each other.
Beginning with the informal system, as Haley notes, "[tjhere is... a dark side
to Japan's resort to social controls. Implicit in reliance on community rather than
the state in maintaining social and economic order is the substitution of private
for public means of direct coercion.' 79 The fact that Japan's government does
not interfere with the informal social control mechanisms allows individual
groups to exert extreme coercion on individual members. This approach, which
infects the formal systems of control, obviously has the benefit of suppressing
aberrant behavior, but it also remains insulated from constitutional and
governmental oversight, and leaves weaker individuals and minorities without
effective legal recourse.Japanese authorities, as actors in the paternalistic model, tend to treat suspects
and offenders as errant children. Most people would agree that there are some
pretty unpleasant aspects to living in the kind of family which presumes guilt. A
presumption of guilt liberates the "father" to exert a great deal more coercion
than a presumption of innocence (or at least no presumption). The same societal
forces which undergird the informal system-deference to authority, trust in
officials, overwhelming desire to suppress aberrant behavior-lend credibility
and almost unquestioned discretion to law enforcement authorities.
In effect, these societal attitudes lead individuals suspected of crime to behave
in ways that render police and prosecutor activities beyond the scope of
constitutional oversight. "Voluntary accompaniment" can obviously be a good

of sentences below the minimum, at the government's request, for defendants who render
"substantial assistance" to authorities investigating other crimes or suspects. 18 U.S.C. §
3553(e) (1994). There might also be room for further lenient disposition if defendants come
forward with full confession-whether or not the government gleans useful information from
that confession. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f(5) (1994).
179. HALEY, supra note 79, at 183.
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thing if truly voluntary; it may even be a good thing if not voluntary, as long as
the suspect is guilty. But for weaker-yet-innocent individuals presumed guilty,
the price seems too high. Although Japan is not likely to rethink the informal
social ordering which suppresses aberrant behavior, 80 state authority is
diminished when actors in the formal system coerce individuals in ways which
resemble the informal social control.
Although the U.S. criminal justice system seems "process-happy," there are
valid reasons for the state to follow procedural rules when acting in an official
capacity. Japan should ask itself what differentiates formal state action from
informal group action in the administration of justice. The United States has
answered that question in a way which places importance on keeping society
ordered accordingto rules.
The Japanese, looking at the U.S. approach to procedural correctness, should
ask themselves: if police and prosecutorial discretion allow them to act in ways
which go beyond formal oversight and constitutional scrutiny, how does their
behavior differ from that of private enforcers? If part of the goal is to get
individuals to accept moral responsibility and respect authority, how should
suspects and defendants recognize the appropriate authority as anything
substantially different from any other, stronger opponent who does not follow
rules? The more police and prosecutors rely on extra-legal processes, a suspect's
or defendant's acceptance of authority becomes less meaningful because it is
based on the threat of punishment instead of respect for society's rules. At some
point, and certainly for innocent suspects, a confession signals only that a
suspect has bowed to power, not to authority.
While Japan may not be quite to that point, several recent release and retrial
cases have shocked the ordinary Japanese citizen and made many question their
faith in criminal justice authorities.' 8' This observation relates precisely to
Geertz's statement in the introduction. There must be more than naked power
which justifies the action of the state and the continued support from its people.
Professor Hirano has made the following observation:

180. Every year the country reexamines the coercive aspects of society which lead to a
problem of "bullying" in the schools and large numbers of suicides. Newspapers dutifully
report such instances and pose questions which highlight pressures which the social order
creates:
In Japan the victims of bullying are considered as much at fault as the bullies.
Because of the country's emphasis on a group mentality, any child who sticks out
from the crowd is penalized. Schoolchildem follow the old Japanese adage: "The
nail that sticks out must be hammered down".
According to Japanese education ministry statistics nearly 60,000 cases of
bullying were documented last year and five children committed suicide as a
result of being tormented at school, the ministry believes the problem is even
more widespread as the majority of incidents go unreported.
Japan Begs for Advice to Beat School Bullies, SUNDAY TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1996, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File. One never sees, however, any large-scale change.
181. "[I]n my view, much more deep-seated problems [in criminal procedure] remain
unresolved. In fact, the troubled state of criminal procedure in Japan has been brought to light
recently by the various retrial cases ..... Hirano, supra note 63, at 129.
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[P]ersons being detained in holding cells ... [and] questioned in closed
rooms under the complete control of the police... [are] humiliat[ed]. Police
in Japan seek to maintain utmost secrecy about the circumstances of
questioning in holding cells. This is probably because they are aware that
they would be subjected to great criticism if those circumstances were to
become public.'82

With that observation in mind, this Note suggests specific changes to Japan's
right to counsel which better accord with its own values, philosophy, and culture
than the present approach taken.
At a concrete level, Japan should invigorate certain aspects of its right to
counsel. The paternalistic aspects of the Japanese system-while apparently
justified in the case of guilty suspects willing to take responsibility-has some
pretty unpleasant repercussions on truly innocent suspects once authorities
believe they are guilty. Putting aside for the moment the great trust the public
generally has in its police and prosecutors, people do make mistakes. Authorities
can interpret evidence in several ways. A problem with Japan's system is that
there are few real "checks" on the discretion enjoyed by investigating
authorities.' 83 Once police and prosecutors believe a suspect is guilty, judges
approve virtually all requests for detention. It is at this level that Japan could
learn from the U.S. approach to the right to counsel, without significantly
altering the current system for those who are guilty.
In the United States, defendants may expect their counsel to independently
investigate the circumstances of alleged crimes. They do so from an advocate's
position, tending to present as much exculpatory and as little inculpatory
evidence as possible. An unbridled independent investigation clearly would, by
Japanese standards, interfere with ongoing investigations and correctional
processes if done in the exact same manner as in the United States. For instance,
it might encourage guilty defendants to resist confessing, in the hope that their
attorney might present enough exculpatory information to earn their release.
Currently, however, once Japanese prosecutors feel a suspect is guilty, all
energies shift into the correctional mode, requiring confession, and often
disregarding-perhaps because they are no longer able to "see"-exculpatory
evidence for its proper probative value.
Although a great percentage of confessions may be voluntary and reliable, few
people, innocent or not, have the fortitude to resist twenty-three days of
interrogation. For the innocent suspect especially, an invigorated defense counsel
might play the following role: First, right-to-counsel jurisprudence should shift
to allow defense counsel access to the prosecution's records. Although
prosecutors currently need only share evidence they will produce in court,'84 for
innocent defendants, this may lead to overlooking key pieces of exculpatory
evidence. Second, the state should allow defense counsel more room to conduct
an independent investigation. This investigation need not obstruct the
prosecution's ongoing investigation, but would merely require some more

182. Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
183. See supra notes 66-94 and accompanying text.
184. CAsTBERG, supranote 63, at 77 ("Discovery is limited to evidence that is going to be
introduced in the trial.").
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(modest) access to suspects and more freedom to conduct external investigations.
This invigorated counsel, to remain within Japan's current value system, would
not be the unbridled advocate as in the United States, but rather, a "fresh pair of
eyes." Counsel would present any information it uncovers to the neutral judge at
the time the prosecution requests additional detention-the second ten-day
period.
This proposal walks the line between the current approach with virtually no
oversight, and the U.S. approach which would interfere with Japan's dual goals
of evidence-gathering and specific prevention. Such an approach also
reinvigorates the judicial oversight function of the pretrial detention system by
giving judges more tools, specificall, more evidence to weigh, in evaluating
whether to order additional detention.185
As Hirano notes, "the real substance of criminal procedure in Japan lies in the
investigative process. . . .[It] is an inquisitorial process performed by the
prosecutors and police."' 86 There is no reason, of course, that inquisitorial
systems need be less respecting of individual rights. Germany bears this point out
through various procedural requirements.' 87 The statement that investigative
process represents the "real substance of the criminal procedure" begs the
question: if there is no judicial oversight into prosecutorial conduct, but law
enforcement authorities enjoy unfettered discretion, where is the "real
substance"? The benefit of invigorating the role of defense counsel is that it
brings into alignment Japan's own procedural theory and investigatory practice
(at least modestly); it cuts down on the potential for abuse of discretion by police
and prosecutors and gives some measure of protection to truly innocent
suspects.188
CONCLUSION

Both Japan and the United States benefit, not so much through imitation as
through encouraged reflection, from a comparison of the right to counsel and
how such a right fits into each criminal justice system. Examining the right to
counsel in each country exposes a great deal more than merely the extent of such
a right: it helps explain the underlying goals of criminal justice. To the extent
that the right to counsel exposed goals beyond mere crime control, both Japan
and the United States can learn to retool their rights, first, to accord more with
their own systems' animating premises, and second, to take into account other
objectives seemingly not comprehended by the current system.
The United States would learn that treating offenders leniently with an eye
towards reintegration into society need not result in more crime. It would also

185. Currently, Japanese judges grant 99.7% of prosecutors' applications for detention of
suspects. See supra notes 78 and 143.
186. Hirano, supra note 63, at 131.
187. In Germany, courts, not prosecutors determine guilt, defendants and suspects have the
right to refuse to testify, and for counsel to sit in. Id. at 130-34.
188. Presumably, guilty suspects will not benefit from the "fresh pair of eyes" because it will
not convince a judge that the detention is inappropriate. Thus, for the vast majority of cases,
there will be no detrimental effect on thq investigation or rates of confession.
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benefit the United States, at the private level, by educating citizens of the need
for reinvigorated mediating institutions such as family, church, and local
community. Japan demonstrates that, if strong enough, those institutions might
facilitate a shift in the focus of criminal justice from one of punishment to one
of rehabilitation and reintegration. With regard to the right to assistance of
counsel itself, Japan's example teaches that staunch adversarial positions might
preclude the correctional benefits which come from confession. While the United
States would not go to Japan's non-process extreme, it still accords with the
United States' own notions of procedural fairness and dignity to have a right to
counsel which does not encourage defendants to solidify adversarial positions.
In a similar way, Japan can learn from the U.S. approach that formal processes
serve as the primary means by which government differentiates its acts from mere
private power, and thus earn respect and continued deference from its people.
Although not at great risk presently, current investigative methods might not find
as much support if made fully known to the public. 9 A partially invigorated
right to counsel might restore some measure of procedure to its putative
processes while not unduly burdening law enforcement efforts at correction and
specific prevention-both laudable goals.

189. Hirano, supranote 63, at 136.

